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______________________Introduction_____________________
The year is 2008, 85 year old George Blake is called on stage by Vladimir Putin
to be recognized with the Order of Friendship. Memories brought to the forefront by the
recognition of one of the most important double agents throughout the Cold War,
reignite concepts of a continued conflict. As a British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS)
member who defected to the Soviet KGB in 1953, Blake had already received the Order
of Lenin in 1961 and his involvement throughout the peak of the Cold War saw Putin
honoring one of Russia’s greatest spies.1 As an essential source of information about
various Anglo-American operations, Blake is evidence of the significant value placed on
such double agents. One of his greatest intelligence coups involved Operation Gold and
leaking information about the top secret tunnel under Soviet territory in Berlin from 1953
to 1956. The tunnel itself was an Anglo-American joint venture to acquire intelligence
about Soviet military and their movements. In short, it was an operation with
considerable financial investment from the CIA, planned for two years and completed in
1955 with the purpose of providing consistent coverage of Soviet activity. Constructed
completely covertly and operational for just under a year, I argue that Operation Gold is
evidence that this desire for intelligence was a major motive throughout the Cold War
underlining the traditional narrative of the period. Furthermore, it has connotations for
the importance of covert activity in the ongoing rivalry between Russia and an
Anglo-American alliance which can be identified in 21st century relations.
Tony Halpin, ‘Vladimir Putin honours traitor George Blake with tit-for-tat birthday medal’, The Times 1
 4
Nov 2007.
https://web.archive.org/web/20080517023556/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article2
865969.ece.
1
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Only a month prior to Blake’s honoring by Putin the Queen had similarly honored
a KGB defector, reflecting the deteriorating Anglo-Russian relations of the late 2000s.
The death of Alexander Litvinenko in November 2006 as a result of poisoning with
radioactive polonium-210 saw the start of this narrative. Fast forward 12 years and the
poisoning of former Russian agents on British soil in Salisbury has truly reignited these
tensions.2 Regarded as an act of terrorism, the use of a substance, illegal under the
Geneva conventions, marks the fresh low point in attitudes toward Russian action
internationally. These events see global politics increasingly reflecting sentiments of the
Cold War in the 1950s. In the modern day it is the presence of Putin which provides an
easy link to past events, from the beginning of the new millenium to the current day
Putin has maintained his grip over Russian political life. His past in the KGB has been
questioned as a key element to a form of dictatorial control; the Cold War may seem
part of history but events that characterised the conflict have continued to be present
into the modern day. The development of Cold War methods and narratives into the
modern day allow a greater understanding of how covert warfare developed. The
honoring of Blake invites us to look back at events as a framework to understand more
recent developments in a second Cold War or in many ways the reignition of the 20th
century Cold War. The relations between the West and Russia have always seemingly
been tied to this narrative of the Cold War and while globalization, societal and technical
advances have altered these interactions, it is increasingly evident that this tie is
unlikely to be severed in coming years.
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The titular Berlin Tunnel under the pseudonym Gold for the CIA and
STOPWATCH for the British took place from 1953-56. The origins of the covert
operations on the US side began in earnest in the late 1940s after communist led action
in France and Italy. The term “covert psychological operations” is particularly relevant
for the majority of US operations as they often focused on discouraging communist
momentum in capturing the minds of Europeans.3 “Covert psychological operations”
refer to agents being deployed in order to influence how events unfold, in this case,
discouraging the spread of communism. Operation Gold, on the other hand, was a
significant investment in information gathering in order to achieve a greater
understanding of Soviet standing and affairs. The nature of Cold War conflict is perhaps
most clearly represented in this separate sphere of activity behind the technological
advances and arms race. The tunnel itself was a significant attempt to address the
seeming intelligence imbalance between the US and Soviet Union. While the US had
substantial resources, the tapping of Soviet cables in the Eastern zone of Berlin was a
sizeable operation which saw the advantages the Americans did have, utilized to correct
its shortcomings. As a form of surveillance, the Berlin tunnel represents a large
technological advance within the covert sphere. The value of information within the Cold
War and to the CIA and KGB activity was directed toward uncovering knowledge of the
status of the opposition’s infrastructure, finances or respective intelligence. As Michael
Warner states, ‘The fact that East and West avoided direct conflict in the Cold War

David Murphy, Sergei Kondrashev, and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold
War, Yale University Press, (1997), p.103
3
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stemmed in part from the achievements of their intelligence systems.’4 A number of
Cold War events tested this hypothesis but in avoiding direct conflict the intelligence
community effectively ensured both sides often had information about deeper
motivations and the extent of activity that might be taken. This prevented decisions that
would be irreversible in a nuclear capable environment. Operation Gold had a large role
in this as it established battle order (BO), a term for military positioning and resources,
for the Soviet armies.
The construction of the roughly 1500 foot tunnel through a collaborative
operation between the CIA and SIS in 1954 is commonly seen as a great technological
achievement, it both built on previous advances and capitalized on unique
circumstances. The CSHP Report states that ‘In retrospect the first question, “Could the
tunnel be dug?” was never really a debatable one - those concerned more or less
decided that given sufficient money and personnel the job could be done.’5 Despite the
various barriers to the successful completion of the covert construction, the operation, at
least among the intelligence community in the know, was rarely doubted. Any
reservations about the feasibility were overshadowed by the enthusiasm and belief of
those who permitted the operation to proceed. This can be related to the balance of
power between the USSR and US at the time, such that the CIA saw an opportunity to
finally use technological and financial superiority to attempt to rebalance the covert
sphere. The results it produced have since been questioned with subsequent
developments around the operation proving that its seeming airtight security and
Michael Warner, The Rise and Fall of Intelligence: An International Security History, Georgetown
University Press, (2014), p.131
5
Clandestine Services Historical Paper No.150, The Berlin Tunnel Operation 1952-1956, p.7
4
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secrecy had one major leak. This makes straightforward conclusions harder to come by.
In addition to this, while the information derived was substantial and the documents
surrounding the operation are numerous, Allen Dulles opened the operation with a
commitment to keeping as little on record as possible. Furthermore, the British side of
the operation has still not declassified documents.
The selection of the pseudonym ‘Gold’ is of particular interest in analyzing the
development of covert affairs as it was an evident advance on the British led Operation
Silver in Vienna. This downscale version of the Berlin tunnel laid the essential
foundations to the success of its successor. The British had already successfully tapped
Soviet communication lines in Vienna utilising the sewer network, with the division of the
city providing an essential model for the situation which the CIA and SIS found
themselves in a couple of years later in Berlin. It was also noted that the expertise
developed by the British in Vienna was the main factor for their substantial involvement
in the technical details of Operation Gold. The benefits of divided cities in both of these
operations went beyond the symbolic value of breaching physical barriers between East
and West. The importance of both Vienna and Berlin as communications hubs prior to
the split of Europe meant that cables did not observe the new state of affairs and were
used in the same fashion as in the decades leading into the Cold War. This scenario
created interesting possibilities and enabled operations such as Silver and Gold to have
value. Berlin would be an obvious target and location given the statement of Martin that,
Second only to Moscow, Berlin was the hub of the Soviet communications
system. “As a result of the 19th century imperial control of great European
nations, all cables ran from the provinces into the capitals and back out again...In
7

Eastern Europe, “everything came to Berlin. When the Soviet commandant in
Bucharest or Warsaw called Moscow the call went through Berlin.”6
As suggested Vienna shared these similarities with Berlin. David Pike explores these
implications: ‘Vienna, like Berlin was not only a local source for signal traffic but also a
switchboard for communications all over Europe’.7 The importance of communication
lines being uncompromised by the arbitrary surface boundaries, aided the greater
emphasis on covert attacks of communications as seen with both of the tunnels. The
potential value of Operation Gold was secured with the successes of Operation Silver
and the understanding of communication lines. In fact this understanding allowed a
particularly simple experiment which further strengthened the commitment to the tunnel
operation in Berlin. Martin states that it was largely a matter of previously linked lines
being disconnected from their terminals, thus meaning ‘that all that was required to tap
into the East Berlin system was to reconnect the lines.’8 This resulted in an early tapping
of East German lines by simply reconnecting previously severed lines and routing it
through a West German post office. As an effort which was not covert this experiment’s
lifespan of three weeks was necessary, although also enough to provide evidence of
value behind tapping communication lines in Berlin. The Berlin Tunnel was not an
operation taken lightly, though subsequent reaction goes to show the possible moral
dilemmas of tunneling into enemy territory which was certainly underestimated among
the elites who rubber stamped the activities. Thorough planning and preparation meant

David Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors, Harper and Row, (1980), p.75
David Pike, ‘Wall and Tunnel: The Spatial Metaphorics of Cold War Berlin’, New German Critique,
No.110, p.77
8
Wilderness of Mirrors, p.75
6
7
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the build up to the operation was as long lasting as the tunnel itself. This was
necessitated by other seemingly mundane aspects such as soil type, water table
distribution and location of a graveyard nearby.
These technical details call closer attention to the path from Operation Silver to
Gold. As stated, it was the expertise of the British from their successes in Vienna that
informed their involvement in the more specialized elements. The collaboration hinged
on this involvement, as the CSHP report covers: the British would: (1) drive a vertical
shaft from the tunnel’s end to the targets; (2) effect the cable taps and deliver a usable
signal to the head of the tunnel for recording’.9 Now the British were involved, resources
could be pooled together and both the US and UK would host centers for translation
and analysis of information. While Operation Gold could be seen as the US dominated
equivalent to the British led Operation Silver, the development of collaborative ideas
was very much a necessity for the Americans seeking an effective project. The flaws in
US capabilities were addressed by collaboration but the scale and eventual completion
of the tunnel certainly points toward American ingenuity and expertise. While the nature
of the operation necessitated measures which may seem overly cautious, approximately
10 foot of top cover and highly sensitive location made these measures essential to the
operation’s success. In addition, this resulted in significant investment in equipment and
specialized methods, including completely buying out two companies’ stocks of plastic
piping in order to cool the equipment room. While the implementation section does
address the predominant amount of these features, the planning of the tunnel contains

9

CSHP No.150, p.11
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essential commitment to the values which informed the investment in these methods.
The nature of the operation made it impossible to avoid interaction with significant other
events, from the original thoughts all the way through to its discovery.
The state of intelligence as a whole is not often considered as part of the
narrative of the Cold War, often relegated behind the public narrative of resources,
weapons and technological superiority. While it was testament to the success of
intelligence agencies in discouraging physical conflict between the US and Soviets the
balance of power was shifting between the CIA and KGB throughout the Cold War.
Furthermore, the differences between the rival agencies are indicated in the nature of
operations that were undertaken. The KGB was much more developed than the CIA
when the Cold War began. This is tied to their presence from the time of Lenin as the
Cheka. With a much longer history the KGB had much more significant mastery of
HUMINT (Human Intelligence) than the CIA when it emerged. This can also be related
to the emergence of double agents such as Blake whom the Soviets relied upon for
much of the inside information they had on their Western enemies. This balance was
being shifted by the technological narrative of the Cold War, as, ‘The United States was
able to develop a unique intelligence culture which focused on technological means of
collection because of its technological advances.’10 With greater fiscal resources the
CIA could take advantage of the technology and communications which were
characterising the development of the Cold War. While the CIA could therefore relatively
dominate the KGB in technological terms, with Operation Gold a reflection of this, the

Gabriel Margolis, ‘The Lack of HUMINT: A Recurring Intelligence Problem’, Global Security Studies,
Vol.4 No.2, p.44
10
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US could not completely disregard the importance of human intelligence. The case of
Blake and Free Jurists, the latter being an East German human rights group supported
from the West by the CIA, indicate that traditional spies, double agents and informants
were still as highly valued as ever even at the peak of technological advances.
Operation Gold was a form of COMINT (Communications intelligence). Margolis adds a
significant drawback that can impact these technologically driven operations, notably, ‘A
target can go ‘off the grid’, rendering the COMINT operation irrelevant.’11 With these
differences it effectively becomes a discussion of industry scale technological covert
operations versus the specific and detailed information from human agents. Realistically
both need to exist to create a full picture of a enemy’s standing.
The role of traditional agents characterises the Berlin tunnel operation as a result
of George Blake’s involvement. As a double agent in the SIS, his presence in the
narrative tarnishes the collaborative element from the British side. However, it is heavily
debated as to whether Blake’s involvement actually undermined the results of the
tunnel. He later gloated about the number of operations that he compromised, but as an
information source he held exceptional value to the Soviets. This value means his
activity was largely kept at a superficial level rather than directly leading to large
numbers of operations actually being shut down. This is not to say that his information
was superficial in value, but in acting on any of his information, the KGB risked arousing
suspicion about Blake. Therefore, his situation became a balancing act of potentially
shutting down an operation to prevent the US and Britain from gaining information about

11

Ibid., pp.46-47
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Soviet activity and risking Blake’s position, or maintaining a high level mole within the
Anglo-American operations and at least being aware of almost all aspects and their
important details. This defines the economic aspects of covert warfare as it relied on
weighing up potential information gains in terms of value that it could have for policy and
decision making. This was a considerable dilemma in the case of Operation Gold. In
Battleground Berlin Kondrashev argues that even a misinformation campaign was seen
as too resource intensive and risky. It is fairly symbolic that even though the operation
was compromised from the beginning this did not mark its failure. This state of affairs
largely resulted from the economics of the covert conflict that had developed.
Information had its relative value and agents would be valued based on what
information they had leaked or acquired. In addition, classified or significant information
was highly valued. Nationality and type of agent similarly informed the value of a human
source. This can be compared to the simplistic valuation of technologically driven
operations, which amounted to a simple calculation of resources invested.
Seeing Operation Gold as part of a trilogy of events in Berlin that characterize
narratives through the Cold War is a useful lens through which to study its development.
While the Berlin Blockade and the wall receive the most substantial studies and
attention, the Berlin tunnel has not been completely neglected. A series of narratives
constructed often corroborate essential details of the operation, but as shown there are
differences which indicate points of interest. Debate also develops over the nature of
the operation’s legacy and results. Diverging perspectives value the information that the
tunnel did uncover at different levels. The environment also necessitates an
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understanding of the different types of intelligence that could be acquired. While some
results from the tunnel could be reduced to trivial gossip or unimportant details, it is also
difficult to see how the scale of information was simply disinformation from the Soviets.
Wilderness of Mirrors o
 ffered the earliest complete narrative of the Berlin tunnel, but has
since been questioned over its major source, Carl Nelson. Certainly a high profile figure
in the CIA, Nelson it has been suggested, is prone to exaggerate certain details.
Battleground Berlin offers the most substantive and accurate story and has extensive
sources in the know from both the CIA and KGB side. While details of the planning and
implementation of the operation are therefore straightforward to establish, the results
and legacy of the tunnel can be debated from a number of perspectives. It is interesting
to note, on this point, that some CIA officers argued that the psychological benefits of
successfully undertaking the operation were more substantial than any of the physical
intelligence that the tunnel garnered.
The operation should be seen as part of the covert sphere. The covert sphere will
be defined as the arena in which public involvement was minimised and the economy
was run on intelligence and knowledge of the opposition. This arena was heavily
involved in shaping public events, but operations within the covert sphere were rarely
exposed to public scrutiny unless they failed, were discovered or went spectacularly
well. The nature of this arena is essential to the Cold War, as the introduction of nuclear
weapons made physical warfare a self-destructive option. Covert warfare, while largely
dominated by the trade of information, was also directed at undermining elements of
social, economic or political structures. The Berlin tunnel was in many ways aimed at
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fulfilling all these criteria by providing substantial information on the standings of Soviet
military and society. Covert conflict has therefore also been defined and is the
interaction of rival intelligence agencies in covert action and counterintelligence
operations. The world in which the Berlin tunnel took place is one which mirrors physical
warfare. While human casualties were incurred in the covert sphere, the losses or
successes were largely defined by the knowledge acquired and potential destabilization
of the rival’s society. In addition to these considerations, while the public did not
necessarily have access to the covert sphere, they were very much within its influence.
The covert sphere was effectively a bubble everyone was in, but only certain individuals
could ever interact with. This consideration defines Operation Gold and informs later
conclusions about the significance of this covert conflict in the Cold War.

14

______________________Planning_______________________
The planning of Operation Gold began in the early 1950s. The fact that its
planning took two to three times longer than its active period is revealing of its technical
nature and also the meticulousness of those involved. The Clandestine Services
Historical Paper #150 offers the most substantial and firsthand narrative of the Berlin
Tunnel outside of interviews and separate documents in other historical sources. A
commonality is the extensive space taken to cover the planning and situation of the
tunnel. In planning the operation a number of contextual events and trends were
reflected in the concerns of the CIA and MI6. Events such as the Berlin blockade, which
prompted substantial fear of a Soviet invasion of Western territory, should be
considered in analyzing the planning period of the operation. Likewise, intelligence
losses as a result of crackdowns on dissident groups such as the Free Jurists should be
considered. This acts as justification for such a substantial operation moving away from
human agency to technologically driven projects. The context in which the operation
took place can be utilized in the planning section to explain the nature of the tunnel as it
developed. The Cold War had competing narratives with individually significant events
throughout and it is therefore interesting to note the interaction of these events within
the context and timeframe of Operation Gold. This section may therefore be lengthy, but
due to the many considerations involved it would be amiss not to consider the factors
which shaped the operation that Allen Dulles called "one of the most valuable and
daring projects ever undertaken".12 Approached chronologically the different factors

12

David Stafford, Spies beneath Berlin, Murray, (2002).
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within the planning of the Berlin tunnel highlight why the operation was pursued. It will
also clarify the anxieties that influenced attitudes within the allied powers’ intelligence
services during the early 1950s.
Opening the planning section by addressing the Berlin blockade sets the tunnel
within the Berlin theatre of Cold War action. A trilogy of events centering on Berlin
ended with the construction of the Berlin wall. This situation is expanded by
considerations of the evolving methods of a covert conflict in which human intelligence
from dissident groups like the Free Jurists was being obstructed. Operation Silver in
Vienna will similarly inform the narrative towards action in Berlin. These seemingly
disparate events combine to increase the complexity of Operation Gold realization and
situational background. It is important to consider the influences that these
developments had on the psyche and balance of power within the Cold War, but more
specifically in the covert sphere. Works such as Wilderness of Mirrors and Battleground
Berlin b
 oth debate elements of the tunnel’s planning; it is perhaps inevitable that the
latter work often tends to correct aspects of the narrative. In the case of the planning
stage for Operation Gold this was related to previous influences such as Operation
Silver, which itself has documents that have not been declassified. Wilderness of
Mirrors was one of the earliest works including Operation Gold as a focus. The narrative
was constructed from interviews with Carl Nelson alongside documents that David
Martin could acquire prior to the more thorough declassification of details. While Nelson
was certainly involved in the operative structures, subsequent publications have called
his narrative exaggerated at points and misleading in others. The process of

16

transitioning from Operation Silver to Operation Gold is a major factor in some flaws of
Nelson’s narrative. Furthermore, with the nature of covert operations being as they are
the details that were exaggerated have since been elaborated and distorted further. The
talk of the “echo effect” which dramatically eased the process of decoding Soviet
cyphers has vigorously been debunked in subsequent work. While the effect itself was
uncovered it was neither relevant to Operation Gold and at the time was not part of a
nuanced understanding of relations in the covert sphere. Simply put, Operation Gold
was an incredibly intricate operation to organize in order to preserve its truly covert
nature. As a result the planning was as significant and long lived as any other stage of
the operation and was therefore open to debate over details within the historiography.

17

Berlin Trilogy: Airlift, Tunnel, and the Wall
The trilogy of events in Berlin that defined it as the center of Cold War Europe
began with the Soviet Berlin Blockade and the Allied Airlift. The Berlin tunnel marks the
less known second event in the symbolic trilogy. It is also interesting to note that many
escape tunnels were dug once the Berlin wall was constructed. Operation Gold saw the
construction of a tunnel before there was anything to tunnel under except the ever
closing iron curtain. The Berlin Blockade and Airlift were certainly relevant to the psyche
of US officials leading Operation Gold. Fears of Soviet aggression and movement within
Europe have been noted as key motivators for covert activity:

While the eavesdroppers pursued their clandestine tasks beneath the streets of
Vienna, Cold War shadows rapidly darkened the landscape above. Stalin’s
blockade of Berlin sparked a major war scare. Fears of a surprise Red Army
attack in Europe gripped Washington, where bitter and traumatic memories of
Pearl Harbor remained fresh.13
The Berlin Blockade, 24 June 1948 to 12 May 1949 was a major crisis of the Cold War.
While the events that have followed showed that some of the fears and anxieties the
move caused were not realised, it is certainly easy to see why allied forces were fearful
of escalation. The to-and-fro which characterized events in the Cold War can be
observed in events of the Blockade and Airlift. It could be seen as a partial result of
allied provocation introducing the Deutsche mark to West Berlin. However, the nature of
divided Germany and Berlin did leave the Western sector of the capital susceptible and
weak to actions such as the blockade. With the capital deep in Soviet territory the

13

Stafford, Spies beneath Berlin, p.42
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complete blockade of access into West Berlin meant valuable and essential goods and
resources could not be delivered. The aggressive nature of the blockade certainly
marks an attempt to remove allied influence within Berlin but the allied response
dramatically shaped how the saga was perceived.
The Berlin Airlift operated longer than the blockade was in place (26 June 194830 September 1949). It was also extremely successful not only in delivering necessities
to West Berlin residents but also as a propaganda victory. This latter success highlights
how Cold War events could be framed to enhance or negate physical or psychological
successes on either side. The total cost is estimated at around $224 million with over
2.3 million tons of supplies. The airlift lasted longer than the active operation of the
tunnel and positioned the allies in opposition to potential Soviet expansionism and
authoritarianism. The intelligence garnered from the tunnel was intended to further
inform about fears of this Soviet expansion that had been sparked by events of the
Blockade and Airlift. It is revealing of the capabilities of the Allied infrastructure and
military that a city of roughly two million inhabitants was supplied exclusively by air for
more than a year. While the Berlin Airlift is a polar opposite to covert operations, the
trends that it characterized ultimately influenced the direction and feelings of the
intelligence officials.
While the tunnel did not have the same investment as the airlift and had no public
profile until its discovery, it certainly built on the same themes. As such the successes
were only conclusions open to debate in the months after its discovery. Nevertheless,
the story that is presented by Murphy shows the influence of intelligence on events

19

around the Berlin Blockade and Airlift. He notes that Battle Order intelligence was
somewhat available prior to the tunnel. CIA officials reassured President Truman that
‘there was no reliable evidence that the USSR intended to resort to military action within
the next sixty days.’14 With this knowledge the CIA had reached their most effective
point in such a volatile environment. When aggressive Soviet action was known to not
have the physical backing it would require, the US could relax considerably more about
the fears that high ranking officials held. This can be seen to frame the events of the
Blockade and Airlift as the US behind the scenes had some confidence in the fact that
the Soviets would not seek escalation. This information led to a conflict of attrition with
both sides testing how far the other would go in order to retain control in Germany and
Berlin. The fear of war was therefore reduced by CIA information, although it was not
eliminated entirely.
While part of a “trilogy” of events which characterize the significance of Berlin,
the blockade and airlift did not directly influence many aspects of Operation Gold.
However, they are definitely part of the environment which was a large motivation of the
eventual CIA activity in Berlin throughout the 1950s. The importance of the CIA can be
seen in directing actions regarding aggressive Soviet activity. Furthermore, the fear of
Soviet aggression also created a greater demand for intelligence. Situating this with the
progress of Operation Silver in Vienna and the other British-led tunnel operations
suggests that much of the Allied covert activity was directed toward reassurance and
ensuring that a possible third world war would be avoided. In addition the effects of a
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blockade were shown to be somewhat restrictive toward CIA activity in West Berlin, but
principle agencies within the Russian zone could be maintained fairly straightforwardly.
This did, however, influence approaches toward groups such as the Free Jurists who
had a client network in East Berlin already. An interesting side note here would be the
claim in Battleground Berlin t hat since the blockade angered East Berliners, there was
an appetite to cooperate with Western intelligence.15 As suggested, while the Berlin
Blockade and Airlift are symbolic events in the public eye, the impacts they produced in
the covert sphere were much more significant. This included a much greater focus on
the intelligence and informative capabilities of an effective agency. With political leaders
aware of the potential consequences of escalation in Berlin, the intelligence agencies
could serve an essential function in informing policies toward Soviet activity. The
blockade and airlift effectively heightened the need for an active and effective
intelligence operation which was being developed heading into Operation Gold.

15
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The Free Jurist Problem
The Cold War is renowned for the lack of direct conflict between the US and
USSR, although many events certainly came close to prompting the collapse of the
precarious state of affairs (the Berlin blockade and airlift for example). Studying the
nature of espionage in Berlin, however, shows a much greater level of direct interaction,
a clandestine war that certainly saw aggression and violence directed toward respective
forces. With impulses and perceptions resulting in the CIA developing a major covert
action capability, East German dissident groups were essential resources in the
development of a covert to-and-fro within divided Berlin. The Free Jurists were one of
these anti-communist groups and were eventually involved in paramilitary activities.
Events surrounding the organization highlight essential aspects of the clandestine
activity that should be seen to define Cold War Berlin. While the building of the Berlin
Wall definitely firmed up the previously more permeable boundaries between sectors,
the actions of agents in Berlin characterized a competition for information and a drive to
undermine and weaken opposing regimes. The Free Jurists were an organization
established in West Berlin to question illegal activity of the communist regime in East
Germany, specifically human rights abuses. It was a ‘subversive organization’ that from
its inception interacted with GDR citizens offering legal advice against said abuses. The
KGB listing of the organization describes it as carrying out ‘espionage activities against
the GDR with the help of its agent net within the GDR’, engaging in campaigns to
weaken and delegitimize communist regimes.16 As a natural source of information on
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East German judicial and security systems the group offered a valuable source of easy
to access information. Furthermore it created a natural network eager to report illegal
acts and offer evidence. West Berlin media and opinion was said to value the group as
a potent underground organization.17 The Free Jurists are relevant to the creation of the
Berlin tunnel as dissident groups contributed to a sense of Soviet anxiety, which led to
tightening restrictions on movement between the East and West. These restrictions
made reliance on technological projects more attractive than relying on human agents.
While the group was established without the CIA, it received its principal funding from
the US agency. This made it an easy target for allegations of espionage, and this
accusation made its leaders and members targets for the KGB.
On 8 July 1952 Walter Linse, head of the economic section of the Free Jurists,
was kidnapped by the KGB. Linse was an attractive target given his role in undermining
particular weak aspects of the Soviet regime, including workers’ rights in nationalized
industries, and labor law. While under interrogation Linse confirmed reports of
anti-Soviet activity. The scale of both the Free Jurist organization and the Soviet
response is notable, in that eighty-four agents were subsequently arrested.18 It is
interesting to note both the blow to the Jurists’ network, but also to the Soviet regime in
discovering the scale of infiltration of various industries. An economic report seized from
Linse further dented the KGB success. The importance of information on the state of
Soviet society is emphasised by the report in which all of ‘GDR industry, trade, and
planning’ was provided with empirical evidence. Linse intended the report for American
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intelligence and through investigations led by the Free Jurists all the details had been
collated. Another aspect to this report which highlights the balance of play in US and
USSR infrastructure is emphasised by the exposure of GDR trading to receive
resources and goods, there were
more than four hundred thousand transactions between GDR offices and West
German firms...This resulted in the detention of about eight hundred traders
involved in these deals and the interruption of receipt by the GDR industry of
goods and raw materials from West Germany in the amount of eight hundred
million marks.19
This information may not have reached the Americans but the flow of details would not
have simply begun with Linse’s report. This suggests that the relevant authorities may
have had a good idea about the difference in resources between the West and East
Germans. The increased targeting of groups such as the Free Jurists highlights why a
variety of information sources was needed. Similarly the increased suppression of
dissent groups meant that more direct covert activity was required. The trend evidenced
by the events of Linse’s kidnapping and eventual execution highlight why Operation
Gold would be valuable to the CIA.
In 1952-53 figures in the CIA proposed the Free Jurists as part of a directed
stay-behind program in response to the US attempting to recapitulate their forces in
response to aggressive Soviet moves and the Korean war. This followed a National
Security Directive of 23 October 1951 calling for resistance forces in areas under Soviet
control. This backfired when disagreement over the virtues of introducing paramilitary
elements to a group concerned principally with legal matters proved to foreshadow the
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eventual collapse of the Free Jurists. While only possessing information about a single
individual the ‘lethal effectiveness’ of East German and Soviet counterintelligence in
bringing down the whole organization can be emphasised. The idea that the Free
Jurists would have this paramilitary branch made them more legitimate targets for
further East German and KGB targeting.
The increase in US attention toward a developed covert capability was somewhat
prompted by the interaction of supported dissident groups and the East German regime.
Pointing to the Counter Espionage (CE) department in West Germany, it is stated in
Battleground Berlin that the sector is said to have been ‘a counterespionage backwater
involved mostly in double-agent operations and support operations’.20 This rapidly
turned into ‘a cauldron of security investigations arising from MGB (Soviet Ministry of
State Security) and MfS (East German Ministry of State Security) operations against
OPC-supported (Office of Policy Co-ordination) groups like the Free Jurists.’21 The Free
Jurists are therefore an essential group for understanding the approach toward human
intelligence in divided Berlin. Dissident groups offered a key source of information for
the CIA or KGB respectively. However, with the ability to target these groups it is
evident that an operation such as Operation Gold would be more difficult to compromise
through kidnappings and abductions without taking those directly involved in the
monitoring of takings. Furthermore, the information received from the Free Jurists
enhanced CIA understanding of Soviet society. Information uncovered by the tunnel
would carry similar value as that provided by the Free Jurists.
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Turning Silver into Gold
Operation Silver represents a precursor to the Berlin tunnel, just as Vienna was a
microcosm of the situation in Berlin. Soviet communication lines were tapped
underground in a divided city with primary action taken by the British SIS. The extra
secretive nature of the operation can also be seen to align with the nature of Operation
Gold. Robert Miller summarises this operation, noting that, ‘The British had established
Section Y, an especially secret section of the SIS...The head of the section was Peter
Lunn. Lunn discovered that beneath the French and British sectors of Vienna lay
telephone cables that linked field units and airports of the Russian army with its
headquarters.’22 The potential value of information from these cables makes clear the
importance of the operation. Furthermore, the product of this operation was a motivation
for US thought about their own operation. The success of Operation Silver can be cited
as the primary reason for SIS involvement in Operation Gold. In addition, the revealing
information that came from the British taps in Vienna likely influenced US decision
makers that a similar operation in Berlin could be as effective if not more so, given the
more significant location of the city. The opportunity for a priceless insight into Soviet
operations was valued more than the resources that would have to be invested to
ensure the success of the operation.
Operation Silver was made feasible by the technical similarities between
communication lines in Vienna and Berlin. The similarities are cited by Battleground
Berlin a
 s the main reason for the eventual joint venture between the SIS and CIA in
R.C.S. Trahair & Robert Miller, Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations,
Enigma Books, (2012), p.275-276
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Berlin. The sentiments behind unifying efforts do change the foundation of the two
organizations working together. These differ between avoiding overlapping effort and a
British technical expertise that was a necessity in the building of the tunnel. As the
declassified report states, ‘The skills developed by the British during the Vienna
operations stood us in good stead and the distribution of effort and expense proved in
the end to be reasonably equitable.’23 Battleground Berlin s uggests a more competitive
nature to the transition from Operation Silver to Operation Gold: ‘In Vienna, SIS efforts
were the first to succeed, and by 1952, CIA had agreed to coordinate its program with
that of SIS in order to avoid overlapping efforts.’24 The collaboration brings Operation
Silver into clearer focus for the details leading into the Berlin operation, notably the
importance of British involvement and their expertise and knowledge that aided the
most significant technical aspects of the building stage.
David Martin, in Wilderness of Mirrors, goes into deeper detail about the nature
of Operation Silver and further widens the focus on sentiments heading into the
collaborative effort in Berlin. He most interestingly suggests that Carl Nelson stumbled
upon details of Operation Silver and as a result the British were forced into sharing their
hard earned communications intelligence. With the environment demanding an
operation along the lines of Operation Gold, Martin states that ‘Nelson could not have
struck Silver - the first successful attack on a major Soviet landline - at a more
opportune time.’25 Operation Silver may therefore have been an operation which was
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not initially intended as a grand collaborative effort. These somewhat negative
sentiments had been quelled by discussion leading into action in Berlin.
The environment referenced is constructed from a number of factors, namely,
‘the advent of ultra high frequency communications’ but also the loss to intelligence
sustained as a result. A CIA Officer asserted that communications changes led to “gaps
in our intelligence coverage which were particularly unfortunate during the period of
Cold War escalation.”26 Operation Silver therefore fulfilled the criteria of a successful
precursor to Gold and showed that such an operation could be undertaken in a much
lower pressure situation than Berlin. Amusingly, however, Operation Silver highlighted a
number of the pitfalls of a covert tunneling operation: ‘MI6 had first set up a Harris
tweed import shop...To its dismay, MI6 found Harris tweed to be immensely popular
with the local population. The first shipment from England was an instant sellout, and
British operatives were soon buried beneath an avalanche of import license applications
as they struggled to keep pace with the demand.’27 This suggests that establishing such
an operation can be problematic. Nelson’s testimony in Wilderness of Mirrors h
 as since
been questioned, and the story of tweed and other misfortune around Operation Silver
may therefore be exaggerations. Nevertheless, this highlights that as a result of the
operation’s nature some seemingly mundane issues can suddenly become serious
concerns. Creating such an extensive covert operation in such a public environment
meant that maintaining a cover was essential. Operation Silver and Anglo-American
study and action in Vienna had effectively been practice for Berlin and Operation Gold.
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Planning while fearing war
So far the overwhelming narrative of the planning stage has been one of reactive
action to fears of Soviet expansionism and aggression. This is not to distance the British
and Americans from the same form of action and place blame exclusively on the
Soviets. However, it is clear that the discussions leading into Operation Gold focus on
Battle Order intelligence. In addition, the success of Operation Silver and tunnels under
Vienna highlighted the extensive possibilities for a similar approach in Berlin. Therefore,
the events covered in this section largely draw attention to the significance of Berlin as a
center of Cold War espionage. David Stafford embellishes this focus by suggesting that
the divide of Berlin was a fundamental gap in the Iron curtain.28 Terming Berlin as the
‘ElDorado for the intelligence services of all sides’, it should be concluded that the
potential value of intelligence would justify operations to secure it.29 Stafford while
analyzing CIA motivations creates an image in which the potential gains would not only
be widely known but also something logically worth exploring. With the location a
formality, given the infrastructure in Berlin, this added to benefits of creating a tunnel to
tap important Soviet communications. The events and narratives correlate to create the
atmosphere in which a daring direct attack on Soviet information could be justified and
implemented. NSC-68 thus stated that ‘the enemy should be weakened from within by
an intensified campaign of covert economic, political and psychological warfare.’30 The
role of the CIA was elevated in this environment and the developing arms race can be
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seen to reduce the possibility of conventional force. As a result, the planning stage of
Operation Gold marks the beginning of a transformation of the Cold War to one in which
fears of escalation were well founded but unlikely to be acted upon conventionally.
Escalation was certainly a fear, which motivated covert activity, but the covert activity
went to show that the extent of this escalation was limited by the potential
destructiveness that would follow. This left the agents of the KGB and CIA to fight over
information and destabilization of the rival regime as the greatest form of conflict. This
development took place in the covert sphere, which was rarely exposed to public
scrutiny.
The planning of Operation Gold was as complex as it was necessary. It is also
marked by the events which shaped the psyche and approach of those involved. Test
tunnels as well as intricate methods to minimize the chance of failure marked the
operation. While this operative stage does not have the concerns of disinformation or
problems of legacy, it is essential in highlighting areas of concern in US and USSR
intelligence. Furthermore, it also highlights the balance of power which was being
shaped in the covert sphere as intelligence agencies took center stage. While the public
focused its concern on the arms race of the early Cold War, Operation Gold goes to
show a parallel narrative in a conflict rarely exposed to public view. This sentiment of a
parallel narrative rarely exposed is relevant later in the press reaction to the operation.
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____________________Implementation____________________
The Process of Implementation
With Operation Gold being a joint operation between the US and British the
logistics were complicated. In addition to this it is worth considering that the tunnel was
being built just 10 feet underground below hostile territory. How could the construction
of such a sizeable project be kept covert? The simple answer is meticulous and
painstaking techniques to ensure every stage was approached independently in order to
reduce the risk of discovery. A significant element to this was reducing possible noise,
‘the demands of security forced delays at every step’.31 One stage epitomises the
meticulous methods. The wall liners which had to be gradually moved along the tunnel
were operated using hydraulic jacks. This would have taken less time if the jacks used
could be set up just once, but for each stage the jacks often jammed and had to be
disassembled instead of ‘a sharp blow from a sledgehammer’ which could move them
onward.32 This caused significant delays, given that it had to be done every 12 inches or
so once dirt was removed. This minimized the noise, but meant for each section of wall
liner the whole process had to be started from scratch. This preparation epitomized the
no costs or corner cutting in order to make the tunnel as foolproof as possible. This
section on implementation aligns with the section of the CSHP report and will consider
the issues that come up in historiography such as the echo effect. While the
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construction is therefore a narrative that is relatively complete, the context and nuances
to aspects of the technology involved see some differences between sources.
Following the completion of the preliminary cooperative details and the selection
of a site at Altglienicke, further stages could be completed.

Activity thus proceeded on three fronts - in Berlin steps were taken to lease the
necessary land and right-of-way easements for the site and a contract was let
with a German contractor. The compound, which was roughly the size of an
average city block, was fenced with chain-type high security fencing and
contained the main operations building (the one story with basement type
warehouse previously described),combined kitchen-dining facilities and barracks,
and another building which housed three diesel driven generators to provide
power for all facilities.33
Fitting this operation into the local environment in Berlin so close to the border to the
Eastern sector posed a number of operational problems. Most crucial was how to
conceal this covert operation. The warehouse which itself was specifically created to
serve a purpose for Operation Gold was disguised as a radar station. In a similarly
symbolic situation to the trilogy of Berlin events, the covert nature of a radar station was
hiding an even more covert operation being created below the feet of the forces who
were watching the facility. Extensive cover was established for the tunnel, which
historians have described in considerable detail. While the tunnel itself was a
technological achievement, the organization of the surroundings and additional aspects
of the operation were similarly significant. All the materials were shipped with innocuous
labels of “spare parts” and “office supplies”, double crated and covered in rubberized
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coating. Throughout the transit from the US to West Berlin the CIA had made every
arrangement to avoid accidental discovery.
Even mundane issues faced in the implementation of the project became
substantial elements of the planning, ‘The second question, “Where do we put the dirt?”,
haunted the minds of project personnel for many weeks and a great many ingenious
ideas were brought forth...until the suggestion was made facetiously that we “dig a hole
and put the dirt in it.”’34 The construction of an unconventional two floor warehouse,
instead of two floors, having the main floor and a basement, was built without the floor.
The basement was to be filled with the dirt removed from the tunnel constructed below.
This was a logistic issue to avoid removing truck loads of dirt everyday. The report does
state that the Quartermaster Corps became interested in the new form of warehouse
due to the ratio of cost to storage space. This marks another technological
advancement derived from the operation as a result of the associated requisite designs.
In addition, the scale of the tunnel added further reverence to the achievement of
completing the tunnel covertly: ‘It was 1,476 feet in length; 3,100 tons of soil were
removed; 125 tons of steel liner plate and 1,000 cubic yards of grout were consumed.’35
Those in charge of the operation needed to explain the construction as an
experiment to the engineers who were unsure as to the reasoning. The warehouse
would be ‘one which would be half above the ground and half below with a ramp
suitable for running fork lift trucks from the basement to the first floor.’36 The security
around the facility was substantial and logs were taken of any movements in and
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around the area. Furthermore, while the cover of a radar station would indeed distract
from the actual operation below, the East Germans and Soviet soldiers who were
observing the facility would equally be maintaining strict watch on who was entering and
exiting the premises. Those planning the operation reasoned ‘that presenting the
opposition with a reason for the site’s existence would make it a less prominent target
than leaving it a “mysterious something.”’37
The proximity to the border made the radar station plausible, and while those in
charge did not see the cover as a long-term option, the eventual unfolding of Operation
Gold did not require a long-term cover story. On the theme of disinformation, however,
this cover highlights a number of nuances to the implementation of the project beyond
the reliability of the information collected from the tunnel. In a covert conflict to create a
radar station in close proximity to the border may seem somewhat aggressive. It was
instead a ploy which was fitted into the overarching narrative of covert activity in Berlin.
Therefore, while Soviet and East German forces were suspicious, it was not too
untoward and simply warranted observation. This could therefore be seen as a
successful form of physical disinformation, a sleight of hand trick to divert attention from
the true purpose of the facility. The audacity of the CIA’s soil mechanic to select an
AN/APR9 state of the art antenna is only matched by his selection being based on its
appearance.38 The Vopos (East German Guards) would have been amazed by the use
of a more costly state of the art receiver just to act as cover for the even more costly
operation taking place below ground.
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When establishing which cables were being targeted and the spot where the
tunnel had to emerge, the methods used required access to the surface. Ingeniously,
the engineers settled on a baseball game. The opportunity to have an object of known
size in Soviet territory would allow them to make measurements. Throughout the game
the ball would be heaved over the border as far as possible (not over a wall at this point)
to create a reference point. While a seemingly clever solution, the operatives did not
anticipate that the friendliness of the East German guards would stymie their plan.
Every time a ‘reference point’ was created, the guards would good-naturedly return the
ball. As a result, the intended reference point could not be established for a substantial
enough period for a technician at the facility to take any readings. While the baseball
ploy failed it was followed by a similarly enterprising attempt to fix the problem, here
summarised by Martin:

Abandoning their bat and ball, the engineers dispatched two CIA agents to have
a flat tire on Schoenefelder Chaussée. While changing the tire, one of the agents
placed a tiny reflector next to the road. An electronic surveyor’s transit hidden
behind the peephole sent out a beam that struck the reflector and bounced back,
giving the precise distance between the two points.39
The ingenuity of the engineers in problem solving is not always addressed in
historiography. What has been covered is the admirable confidence of the engineers
that over the course of a covertly constructed 1500 foot tunnel they could accurately
calculate the position of the cables within a 12 inch range. This is significant given the
small downhill and uphill trajectory of the tunnel following the contours of the ground

39

Ibid., p.80

35

level as seen in figure 1. Further obstacles were met during the construction of the
tunnel but the confidence of the engineers was substantially higher by this stage than
the sentiments heading into the operation.

Figure 1: Schematic View of the Tunnel, CSHP Report Figure 16
The achievement of the engineers is even more impressive when considered
with the obstacles that had to be adapted to and overcome in the process of digging:
1) Encountering a perched water table and the potential flooding of the tunnel.
2) Forced evacuation of the tunnel due to the build up of humidity and heat.
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3) The overheating of the equipment room potentially creating a section of melted
snow on the highway above.
While these obstacles do not inform a greater emphasis on covert warfare, they
highlight the scale of resources that could and were invested if needed. Furthermore, it
epitomises the pragmatic approaches of those involved to ensure that the covert nature
was maintained.
The first encountered problem risked compromising the operation from the start.
A water table in which soil holds a substantial amount of water was not expected to be a
problem for the tunnel given the depth at which it was being constructed. However,
early in the digging process, ‘ground water was encountered at 16 feet instead of at the
predicted 32 feet’. Information indicated that this sloped downward, but this left the
tunnel with half the top cover that was initially anticipated.40 In order to deal with this,
pumps were installed and this adds to the complications suggested in Wilderness of
Mirrors and ‘Engineering the Berlin Tunnel’ in which septic tanks were encountered. In
neither narrative does the same septic tank get hit - Martin suggests one 50 feet into the
tunnel; G. suggests one, only 10 feet into the vertical tunnel from the warehouse. The
seemingly obvious issue of sewage from above is an aspect of the mundane details
which made the environment in the digging of the tunnel particularly difficult. It was not
always possible to be able to see what would lie ahead and engineers have to be
pragmatic in dealing with encountered water. The lower top cover would have been
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problematic to some, but the ability to deal with this highlights the successes of the
implementation and planning of the tunnel.
The second problem encountered caused similar delays and highlighted the
potential obstacles of working in a confined space below ground. The main problem of
having agents in the tunnel was the humidity and heat that the claustrophobic
surroundings created. More than once the tunneling and tapping had to be suspended
to bring in air-conditioning equipment to dehumidify the chamber.41 Tunnels could
conventionally have ventilation shafts. However, this would have jeopardized the
secrecy of the operation. While this is somewhat relevant to the third problem faced, the
humidity and heat would affect the equipment and those operating it. In an environment
of such secrecy the problems caused if the target cables or the equipment encountered
faults would be substantial. Namely if the target cables were affected then the tap had a
much higher likelihood of being found. This was the essential story of the tunnel’s
discovery in 1956. On the other hand, if the specialist equipment encountered faults
then extra resources would have to be invested and the shipping of these essential
parts for the operation was problematic even without considering the further investment
that would be required. Each component was rigorously tested to the highest standard
and with these standards came the extra levels of preparation in order to avoid the
problems that became inevitable given the form of operation.42 With each of these
problems the operation was adapted to overcome the obstacles. This shows that the
officials involved were under pressure to deliver intelligence, and the meticulous nature

41
42

Ibid., p.22
Ibid.

38

of operations was not compromised in order to ensure rapid results. This immediacy
could somewhat be addressed by the recruiting of double agents or paid intelligence
sources who could provide instant intelligence. The chance of losing these sources was
very high, however.
The final and perhaps largest problem at one point of the implementation had the
potential to create suspicion and lead directly to the tunnel, ending the operation
prematurely. This was again related to temperature within the tunnel, this time
emanating from the equipment, which made the recording and machine rooms
substantially warmer than other areas of the tunnel. To add to this, the extra warmth
underground was predicted to cause such a substantial difference at the surface that
snow on the highway might be melted in a patch above where the equipment room was
located. The investment and rapid fix that this promoted is indicative of attitudes toward
the operation overall. After a period of measurements in the summer of 1955, the need
to act was confirmed. A chilled water system was installed rapidly, including newly
developed ¾ inch irrigation tubing.43 Amazingly, this required using up Sears,
Roebuck’s entire East Coast inventory of plastic pipe.44 While the mistake necessitated
the hugely complicated remedy, it epitomizes the meticulousness that has been
suggested throughout. These changes were undertaken during periods in which they
were not required to avoid future complications, in essence using the warmer seasons
to take measures which ensured the operation would not be compromised by harsher
conditions as winter hit. The square of melted snow on the highway would have given
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away the operation hidden below. After addressing this final obstacle the tunnel was in
operation without any issues needing to be solved and the wait for intelligence began.

The tunnel was completed on February 25, 1955 with the target cables exposed
and tapped on 28 March, 1955. The tapping of the cables was itself as precarious for
the engineers as the construction of the tunnel. While the tunnel was ten feet under the
ground, the tap chamber and shaft to the cables had to be built upward toward the
heavily used Schoenefelder Chaussée. With the possibility of collapse for this final
stage of the construction, British expertise was relied upon. The previous operations in
Vienna informed much of the expertise involved in Operation Gold. It is also important to
consider the environment in which the operation was taking place. The importance of
communication in the Cold War necessitated the highest form of security on the most
important lines. The actual tap was therefore the most risky moment of the whole
operation, as a mistake might mean that alarm systems would sound for both the East
Germans and Soviets. The cliche of high risk, high reward, characterized the Operation
Gold venture. The technical details to avoid the East German “fault finder” are therefore
some of the most complex throughout the operation as a whole. Wilderness of Mirrors
captures this saga thoroughly:

The East Germans regularly monitored the integrity of the circuits with a “fault
finder,” a device that transmitted a pulse along the line that would come bouncing
back the moment it discovered a break. The trick was to draw off such an
infinitesimal portion of the signal that the loss would go undetected. With the
rubber sheath removed and the back pressure keeping the nitrogen from
escaping, the British technicians painstakingly clipped wires to the rainbow of
color coded circuits at their fingertips. The wires carried the signal down to banks
40

of amplifiers in the tunnel and back up to rejoin the circuit. The amplifiers boosted
the captured mites of sound and shot them through the tunnel along
lead-sheathed cables that rested atop sandbags to rows of sound-activated
Ampex tape recorders in the warehouse.45
The scale of the possible take becomes clear when one considers that the three cables
tapped each contained a total of 172 circuits carrying a minimum of 18 channels. Even
at minimum this put the number of channels into the thousands. The CSHP report
suggested that only roughly 10% of the total take was expected to be translated and
utilized. This triggers two assumptions, first that the total take was so large that not all of
it could be processed; second, that 10% of the total take would be worth the investment
that had been seen through the planning, implementation and operational stages of
Operation Gold. Teams in both Washington and London worked on material which was
collected. It is also worth noting that the nature of communications on the cables meant
that any form of discovery or suspicion was likely to be processed through the tunnel.
The tunnel produced communications so rapidly that the only form of dealing with
the constant whirring of the machines was a similarly sophisticated component, “the
bumblebee”, which ensured that the rapid collection of communications could be
recorded. Martin notes that to keep pace with “the bumblebee”, ‘the translators and
analysts worked a schedule of two weeks on and one day off.’46 This component played
tapes of communications at four times the speed they were initially transmitted. It also
broke down the 18 possible channels to separate recordings.47 With “the bumblebee”
the CIA could easily observe if certain channels suddenly went quiet or if specific
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channels were reserved for more important information. However, the sheer scale of the
take did mean that delayed translation and transcription occurred; much of the
information was therefore not immediately actionable.
The operations security has already been shown as substantial, and throughout
the implementation of Operation Gold these standards were maintained. Outside
knowledge and the numbers of people in the know were kept to a minimum with those
involved at some levels unaware of the true scale of the operation they were part of.
The deputy chief of the processing section briefed translators in this way: ‘It is greatly in
your interest not to know where any of the material you are processing is coming
from...for the opposition to stop the flow, all they would have to know is that we have
this many Russian and German speakers together.’48 Furthermore, the recordings taken
that were not immediately cabled to Washington or London were shipped under armed
guard aboard military aircraft. No one was going to retrieve these messages until they
reached their destination. “The Hosiery Mill” was the building in which these translators
and decrypters worked. It was situated between the Washington Monument and the
Lincoln memorial. Extensive machinery for processing tapes and other intelligence
sources was present, and perhaps more interestingly, ‘the entire building was sheathed
in steel in order to prevent the electronic pulses that ricocheted about the premises from
escaping into the atmosphere possibly to alert the other side.’49 These precautions
highlight the fears that even a building in the middle of iconic US landmarks was not
safe from potential compromise by the opposition.
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The problems that were encountered during the construction of the tunnel did not
seem to foreshadow any large issues during the active period of the operation.
Extensive monitoring of movement was maintained from the position of the warehouse,
likely mirroring the activity of the guards observing the ‘radar station’ in the Soviet zone.
This was no small matter even during tunneling: ‘operations stopped each time the
German guards walked over the tunnel on their regular patrols...Observation logs were
maintained’.50 These logs represented a form of Battle Order information and ensured
any heightened attention to the facility would be noted. These logs were also
maintained for those who were entering and exiting the facility. As suggested, any
anomalous activity around the facility would be noted. This was relevant not only
externally, for East German movement, but for activity within the facility. All this
preparation did not prevent a large scare being experienced when a series of “thuds”
were heard through a microphone in the tap chamber. Despite panicking agents in the
tunnel this was not the discovery of the tunnel that was feared. Instead once the fog
above ground had cleared, it turned out to be a temporary automobile checkpoint. The
police officer in charge had been stamping his feet to keep warm. While all the
precautions should have left many feeling a sense of security that all eventualities had
been guarded against, the possibility of discovery still left those involved on edge. This
could be related to the tunnel’s presence in Soviet territory. Despite the nature of the
covert war, the moral implications of invading enemy territory become relevant later,
once the tunnel was uncovered. Considering that such a meticulously planned operation
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only operated actively for 11 months and 11 days, it is not surprising that the opportunity
for scares was limited. The greatest chance of undermining the operation would have
been outside of the tunnel itself and extensive precautions were taken at every turn.
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Agent Diomid; George Blake
Such precautions could not have stopped the only major leak of the whole
operation, that of Agent Diomid, or George Blake among the SIS. George Blake was an
SIS/MI6 spy, known under different pseudonyms throughout his career in covert activity.
His life is very much a story which would fit in a Hollywood script. In fact, Alfred
Hitchcock was initially slated to create The Short Night b
 ased on Blake’s life. Blake
became seen as an infamous traitor of the British intelligence service, also
compromising a number of operations involving the CIA. Born in Holland as George
Behar, he was the son of an Egyptian Jew. Martin easily creates an image of his
outsider nature, noting that ‘Blake was the “odd man out” in the cliquish world of British
intelligence.’51 This could most certainly be seen as an important characteristic of the
man that would eventually betray his employers. However, his capture in Korea and
imprisonment as a POW for three years is commonly seen to be the event that most
likely pushed Blake into the hands of the Russian intelligence community. His
conversion to the cause of communism is seen to be demonstrated by the fact that he
charged for the information he provided to the KGB. Wilderness of Mirrors p
 oints to
Blake’s heroic deeds as informing the privileged position he reached in Korea (as MI6
station chief) but also his involvement in Berlin. If SIS/MI6 were a unique and privileged
club, entrance was particularly difficult for someone without connections:

As a member of the Dutch underground in World War II, Blake had made his way
through Occupied France to neutral Portugal and finally to England with a
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warning that the Germans, in a classic double-cross operation, were controlling
almost every team of British agents dropped into Holland.52
Blake thus earned his place in the agency, and perhaps this elevated his value further
and as a result led to his heroic welcome on return from Korea. It is interesting that his
first important action concerned the actions of double agents, given his future path, but
he was clearly a valued and a skilled operative for the British intelligence service.
Martin’s attention to Blake’s career also unveils notable anomalies. This included
his familial connections to the Egyptian Communist Party, but also his insistence that
his secretary keep copies of certain information, ‘for the files, he said.’53 It should not be
surprising that certain aspects of an agent in covert operations are never uncovered, but
Blake was particularly open and braggadocious about his deception when he was
eventually revealed as a double agent over Easter of 1961. Martin cites a CIA officer’s
testimony about actually trying Blake, ‘“If Blake had held out, they would not have had a
case.”...Once he had broken, Blake bragged freely about his treachery.’54 Blake’s role in
Operation Gold was therefore never a physical presence in the construction or active
operation, but one in which he was involved in planning and subsequently hindering its
legacy.
Blake is essential to understanding the economy of the covert sphere and
intelligence war. His time in Wormwood Scrubs prison after being sentenced to 42 years
(longest sentence handed down in the UK at the time) was not marked by any violent or
aggressive response. However, the nature of the intelligence war is seen by Martin as
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having a role in his optimism; agents’ freedom was being traded between the US and
USSR, along with the British in certain cases. Having the confidence that he would be
exchanged is essential to understanding his value to the Soviets. The information he fed
them thus made him a potential propaganda ploy if the Soviets could free and trade
Blake for an agent who had a similar or lesser information value. However, his notoriety
and value was such that it would have to be a similar figure on the opposition’s side to
negotiate a release. Thus when the Russians traded Greville Wynne for Gordon
Lonsdale, Blake’s greatest opportunity for exchange was lost. Wynne was an essential
messenger for Oleg Penkovsky, who himself was one of the few figures who could
match the iconic level of Blake. Lonsdale, on the other hand, was a native Russian who
forged Canadian nationality and stole British naval secrets. This followed a previous
exchange of Rudolf Abel for Gary Powers. In the Wynne-Lonsdale exchange of April
1964 the value of Blake was therefore placed below that of a native Russian but one
who had not garnered such valuable intelligence.55 While Martin asserts that ‘this
decision had nothing to do with the relative worth of the two spies’, it is clear that
nationality and the fact of Blake being a double agent did affect his relative worth.56 In
fact these factors feed into a formula of sorts to establish an agent’s relative worth.
Information itself was as valuable as the leads it generated, but nationality and trust
were of even greater importance. A double-agent was much more unlikely to generate
the same level of trust as an agent raised through the domestic ranks. As such, in
regard to Martin’s analysis that Blake’s lack of exchange for Wynne was not about
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relative worth, if the nationality of agents is considered, this conclusion has to be
challenged.
Following the lack of exchange, Blake then proceeded to plot and successfully
engineer his escape. Interestingly, his escape to Moscow took more than seven weeks.
After escaping Wormwood Scrubs, Blake proceeded to hide with his accomplice
Bourke, ‘in a rented flat less than four minutes’ drive from the prison.57 It could perhaps
be seen as a compliment that his escape prompted the covering of all exits from Britain
and he had to wait for such an extended period. Nevertheless after 24 hours in the back
of a van smuggling him into East Germany, Blake made it to Moscow. In a reflection of
his heroic welcome back to Britain after his freeing from Korea, Blake was honored on
his arrival with the Order of Lenin, the second highest decoration an individual could
recieve in the USSR.58 Blake continues to live in Russia and is now 95 years old. In late
2007 Blake was awarded the Order of Friendship by Vladimir Putin and has since
suggested he maintains a role in Foreign Intelligence.59 This highlights that current
trends and fears can still be traced back to intelligence conflicts that began in the Cold
War.
In an environment dominated by a search for greater information, George Blake
was a huge asset to an already well developed and thoroughly organized Soviet
intelligence community. His desertion to the communist side while maintaining a strong
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position within the British organization enabled the Soviets to pre-empt and have
knowledge about specific operations even before they had been confirmed. Double
agents were especially useful in Berlin given the proximity between sectors and the
permeability of the border before the wall. Nevertheless this also allows the true value of
a double agent such as Blake to be considered in relation to the fact that the Soviets
refused to compromise his position and still allowed information to flow through the
tapped lines. George Blake is in essence a character who embodies the values and
decisions that both the US and USSR intelligence agencies had to take in order to
maximise the information they could achieve. While the Soviets may have attempted to
alter the forms of communication through the lines, they valued Blake more than any of
the information they might release to US and British forces.
Sergei Kondrashev, who served in the KGB and collaborated on Battleground
Berlin, s ent officers a report in February 1954 based on information he received from
Blake. In doing so, ‘the KGB’s top priority became protecting Blake.’ Furthermore
Kondrashev notes that ‘only three persons in the First Chief Directorate were aware that
a source existed.’60 Not only was Blake a highly valuable source but his value was such
that even his own side had limited knowledge of his existence. This importance of
intelligence sources leads into the statement which defines the debate about validity
and value of the tunnel’s information takings. The Soviets found themselves in a
Catch-22: ‘They knew about the tunnel, but they were unable to do anything about it
immediately for fear of compromising Blake.’61 In addition to this simple weighing of
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options, Kondrashev offers the assertion that the communication lines were not used for
disinformation as this would simply require too many people and risk the security of
Blake. As suggested, while the Soviets could logically justify feeding disinformation
through the wires, it was in fact another example of weighing the value of one
information source against the possible losses that could be sustained. This is a primary
reason that the involvement of Blake defines the economics of the information war. The
Soviets had an invaluable source and while information could be lost through the wires
it would certainly be offset by consistent communication of SIS and CIA operations not
only in Berlin but elsewhere. This also highlights that the KGB believed that finding
another source like Blake was incredibly problematic, Operation Gold information being
limited to a select few individuals can further illustrate this value as Blake was in a
significantly privileged position.
Interestingly, in Battleground Berlin K
 ondrashev does state that Blake was not
always correct. Blake’s insistence that the British dug the tunnel is at odds with the
information in the declassified report of the operation.62 The US undertook the major
work of construction, with technical details covered by British experts. This highlights
another potential aspect of the operation: even those in the know were not necessarily
one hundred percent aware of all the details. Furthermore, the nature of double agents
and highly secretive operations meant operatives were not infallible about details simply
because information was shared on a need-to-know basis.
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Collaboration
Throughout the implementation stage the general success of the operation
hinged on the cooperation between the British and American forces. Not only were the
most technical aspects of the tunneling left to the British but the resources in London
were pooled with those of Washington in order to cater to the substantial requirements
of the operation’s success. The nature of this cooperation sees its own disagreements;
with the level of amiability between the British and Americans being debated, this does
not compromise the presence of cooperation at the most significant points however. It is
worth noting, though, that the preliminary elements of Operation Gold were not part of a
unified attempt at tapping East Berlin intelligence sources.
The British involvement ended up being one of the most significant narratives of
the Berlin tunnel, from its planning up to its legacy. The presence of Blake along with
the choreographed nature of the tunnel’s discovery are evidence of this significance.
The nature of the collaboration was defined early with minutes from meetings that have
since been released along with those leaked by Blake. Stafford spends a whole chapter
on ‘2 Carlton Gardens’; the headquarters of the SIS Section Y which was chiefly
concerned with the most secure and important operations relevant to British
intelligence. Importantly this was the location of early meetings and planning of the
Berlin tunnel. Stafford notes a motivation for the early attention to the potential
intelligence contained in the cables in Berlin. With ‘The West possess[ing] only a
sketchy Soviet order of battle’ it was a priority to fill the gaps of intelligence. Judging the
intelligence gains against the initial motivations subsequently enhances the nature of
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the information garnered.63 Considering that Order of Battle information effectively
dictates immediate action policies, this was therefore a significant gap in Western
intelligence. This is especially the case in Berlin with the often volatile environment
creating a situation in which awareness of the opponent’s real standing was the most
important intelligence.
The precedence placed on the US direction relegates aspects of theBritish
involvement. However, the level of British technical involvement revealed when the
tunnel was uncovered, just in the equipment within the tunnel, highlights that the SIS
role was much greater than stated in the operations report. The CIA report states:

The British would: (1) drive a vertical shaft from the tunnel’s end to the targets;
(2) effect that cable taps and deliver a usable signal to the head of the tunnel for
recording; and (3) provide for a jointly manned US-UK center in London to
process the voice recordings from the site.64
The expertise of British agents involved in the Vienna operations led into their
involvement in Operation Gold. Stafford presents an image of a Cold War world where
the covert sphere did not necessarily involve unification between the Western agencies.
According to Stafford, ‘The Americans had begun their cable reconnaissance work in
Berlin independently of the British.’65 This brings back ideas of Operation Silver, in
which British tunneling had already begun before US interest. Despite only outlining the
physical involvement of the British agents in the construction of the tunnel it is
consistently noted that without their involvement the operation would never have been
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possible. With both US and UK agencies already undertaking their own intelligence into
the possibility of such an operation the British experience was the essential enabler to
allowing the Americans to forge ahead. The US were the resource heavy directors, but
were only effective with the British expertise and technical leadership. The SIS were not
therefore involved in large elements of the operation especially given the ‘need-to-know’
security protocol, but were essential consultants on various engineering aspects. The
cost would be borne largely by the CIA. In addition, the tunnel originated in the US
sector. This informs the media and public reaction which placed almost exclusive
responsibility on the US.
British and US attitudes toward the Soviets were therefore similar from the high
ranking officials to the agents undertaking operations. Furthermore, they both faced
similar issues and fears, which informed the operation they collaborated on. Late 1953,
early 1954, Soviet position in Europe bothered US and British intelligence agencies
alike. ‘Thirty Red Army divisions were based in Germany’. Simple questions were
asked: Why were they there? What were the Kremlin’s intentions? What was the state
and shape of the forces? Building from this ‘The Iron Curtain was now virtually
impenetrable. Both the CIA and SIS were finding it virtually impossible to run agents
behind enemy lines.’66 Collaboration was not a default policy but was certainly a result
of necessity in the case of Operation Gold. In addition, collaboration was in this case
mutually beneficial given the respective states of the US and UK. While it is claimed in
Battleground Berlin that Operation Gold was an attempt to avoid overlapping
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operations, tensions can be extrapolated from some elements of narrative around the
initial plans. Not only was the balance of power tipped toward the US, but it is
suggested by Martin in Wilderness of Mirrors that the US ground-breaking discovery of
the “echo effect” was not shared with the British agencies.67 This would be a huge
breach of trust between the two allies and it has since been vigorously denied that the
“echo effect” was even relevant to Operation Gold. Nevertheless this state of affairs
could be seen to suggest that not all elements of intelligence were shared between
agencies. Collaboration on Operation Gold/Stopwatch did not enforce the same
constructive relationship on all operations; the scale of the operation did, however,
require awareness of other projects, operatives and methods which may be relevant. As
suggested, while the collaboration was mutually beneficial in a significant way, the
involvement of the British did also introduce Blake as a factor in how the operation
should be seen as a whole. While the construction itself could not be shaped by Blake’s
involvement, the Soviets at least had some awareness of the plans and how they were
to be carried out. As a result, the exaltation of Agent G. in ‘Engineering the Berlin
Tunnel’ summarises the success of the implementation section: ‘The simple truth...is
that Leslie M. Gross and this Army Corps of Engineers staff, along with the British
sappers, built the tunnel and tap chamber in SECRET!! Hand salute, gentlemen, hand
salute.’68 Whether the planning, results or legacy can be clouded by contextual factors,
one of the most significant successes was the actual successful construction of the
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tunnel and tap. Furthermore, the constructive collaboration between US and UK
agencies highlights the mutually beneficial possibilities of joining resources.
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Successful Execution
The implementation of the plans for the Berlin Tunnel highlight all the themes that
have been suggested through the thesis so far. All the problems that were encountered
were unforeseen and dealt with as they came. Otherwise those involved largely planned
for every eventuality. There are divergent views regarding the planning and ultimate
value of Operation Gold. However, in regard to its implementation there is no
disagreement. The construction marked a crowning achievement. Whether the
substantial intelligence take was useful or not, completing the facility and tunnel without
the operation being blown was a significant success for both the US and British. It is
important to note that the CIA was seen at that time as backward in comparison to the
Soviet agencies, and with this collaborative operation the CIA saw a great upswing in
prestige. This informs the later discussion of the tunnel’s discovery. However, internal
confidence was enhanced by the operation regardless of the limited knowledge of the
true scale of the operation. While knowledge of the operation was kept to a minimum,
the intelligence that was being translated was still visible to others even if the source
was not. This adds to the idea that the internal confidence was enhanced, since those
around any of the materials would see substantial amounts of intelligence on the
Soviets. In the environment that the operation was part of, this was an important
success since American intelligence had been having a tough time, especially
discovering Order of Battle information.
The implementation stage was a great success for both the CIA and SIS. While it
has been established that the operation was expected to have a limited life, this should
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be seen as extended by the success of the construction. Even in a progress report of
the tunnel’s construction, the radar station cover story is a notable success: ‘In fact, the
acceptance of the installation in the role paraded for it has, we believe, been even better
than we had hoped.’69 As suggested, the problems encountered were efficiently dealt
with and the meticulously planned elements were carried out effectively. The tunnel was
constructed with East German guards and Soviets not in the know clueless to the
operation. While it has been shown that Blake had compromised the mission, the
implementation of the operation did not give the Soviets any easy option to “discover”
the tunnel. The nature of collaboration has also been shown to be hugely beneficial and
a necessity for the full completion of the project. If the operation was being judged up to
this point then it was a unanimous success despite the problems that were
encountered. This also informs many of the concepts that are relevant to the information
conflict as a whole. The radar station cover as suggested is very much a technique to
divert attention. Similarly, the nature of taking measurements from a game of baseball
or planning a flat tire as an alternative, highlights pragmatic and astute techniques of
circumventing security and obstacles created by the covert conflict in Berlin.
Another interesting consideration concerns the collaborative nature of the
operation. The nature of covert conflict meant that the Anglo-American alliance was
unlikely to ever see completely full disclosure. While the success of collaboration
highlights the possibilities of pooling resources and expertise the CIA and SIS were still
independent. Both agencies had previously been investigating many of the same
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potential intelligence sources. This narrative begins with tunneling in Vienna and is only
built upon in Berlin. The CIA covered the major costs and took the blame despite never
formally admitting responsibility. The tunnel was a unique operation as it could only be
undertaken at one of two sites and the intelligence that it was expected to glean was
such that collaboration was the only viable way of ensuring its success. While British
expertise was essential to the successes, the CIA is still seen to have held back certain
information from their allies. This is seemingly an essential theme in Operation Gold;
despite the huge scale and significance of the operation, certain players were often
oblivious to the nature of the tunnel, even those in its vast network. The translators were
certainly kept in the dark about the source of the material they were translating. In many
ways, the CIA can be seen as a group of splinter cells with a select few individuals
being in charge of the large network that would emerge from specific operations. By
isolating individual elements the operation had a much greater sense of security, as it
could not be compromised by one of the Russian speakers in the ‘Hosiery Mill’ or one of
the engineers initially involved in constructing the warehouse.
The construction of the tunnel and implementation of plans reveals substantial
information about the nature of the covert conflict. It also firmly establishes the idea of
CIA technological advancement in the face of the KGB’s dominance in human
intelligence. While the Iron Curtain is seen to be closing, the tunnel marked a significant
episode in circumventing the increasing defensiveness of both sides of the Cold War.
The covert conflict was less affected by the implications of physical changes to the state
of the Cold War, such that major public fears of war did not discourage ambitious and
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potentially aggressive projects. However, the addition of nuclear weapons and
increasing anxiety and fears certainly informed the sentiments leading into Operation
Gold. Implementing such a significant operation is representative of these sentiments in
US intelligence circles. Furthermore it builds on narratives established earlier of the
failure of other operations such as the Free Jurists or the success of Operation Silver.
The Berlin tunnel was effectively intended as the go to news source of Soviet Order of
Battle information. Whether its legacy and results are universally positive or not, the
implementation of the operation saw this tap created. The covert conflict was a battle for
information about the motivations and intentions of the enemy, and as such, physical
data was not always necessary. Evidence of a lack of conviction or backing in the
opposition was as significant if not more so, especially if reasons for these misgivings
could be identified. The success of the implementation of Operation Gold is tribute to
the years of planning and significant investment that was devoted at every stage.
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______________________Discovery______________________
Termination
The termination of Operation Gold on 21 April 1956 was a hugely significant
event for both the Americans and Soviets. Reasons for its discovery have been debated
and multiple narratives are established as to why Soviet workers ended up digging up
the cables and reaching the end of the tunnel. What can be observed is the huge media
attention that the discovery received. The responses from the East and Western media
are perhaps inevitable given the need to cover the discovery positively on the respective
sides. The response largely concerned the consequences of the operation and shows
how important the presentation of events could be. While this presentation is revealing
in itself, the termination of the mission is also worth studying. The intricacies which
result from the nature of the operation are again all in play at this point. While the
mission could have been ended fairly abruptly when the Soviets received Blake’s
intelligence, it was not. In addition, the nature of the discovery points to a more
accidental Soviet uncovering. This leads to two potential conclusions: firstly, that the
Soviets did not have the opportunity to truly choreograph the discovery; secondly, the
Anglo-American leadership may have anticipated a longer active period than the 11
months, 11 days that the tunnel operated. It is consistent through the sources that
natural effects were potential causes of the tunnels uncovering. What is less clear is
whether the ensuing discovery was a result of actual accident or once alerted, a rapidly
choreographed attempt to delegitimize the US.
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In the ‘Termination’ section of the CSHP CIA report, the contemporary
conclusions are focused on natural and unavoidable circumstances. Two factors are
named: ‘one of the cables was in very poor physical condition (this was known from the
beginning) and a long period of unusually heavy rainfall.’70 The circumstances of the
termination therefore underscored positivity about the operation since those in charge
firmly, and logically, believed that the only flaw which caused the end of the operation
was a Soviet problem and one of pure chance. Just because a cable was in poor
physical condition could not discourage tapping it for intelligence. Similarly, it did not
mean that the Soviets were not using it. Routine maintenance and the gradual
deterioration of wires and cables is a natural consideration and thus one which is
possible for any wiretapping operation anywhere. Furthermore, in this Cold War
environment of covert operations and importance of communications, cables would
have been checked to ensure that no problems would be encountered. The ‘fault finder’
addressed in the implementation section highlights this level of security around
communications. Even from the beginning of the operation, its lifespan was limited and
a potential factor in this would be Soviet or East German maintenance of the cables and
subsequent discovery of the tap. Therefore to compromise the mission due to the
condition of one of the target cables would be a shortsighted view which would also
damage the possible intelligence gain of the operation as a whole. Add to this
considerations of rainfall and it is impossible to argue with the knowledge of the agents
at the time that the termination of the tunnel was due to anything other than chance.
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Immediately after the tunnel’s discovery a report was created. In this, it is considered a
‘purely fortuitous’ discovery with consideration for the heavy rains which had faulted
many phone and telegraph cables in the area.71 Even in the planning and
implementation of the tunnel it has been addressed that natural obstacles caused
issues for those in the operation. A perched water table, creating a pool of water
underground, falls into this same category of unfortunate circumstances. At the time it
was evident that as far as the termination of Operation Gold was concerned, natural and
unforeseen circumstances led to the premature ending.
In the termination episode it is noticeable that Soviet attentions were firmly
placed on their own communications. Whether or not Blake’s information had directed
the crews who unearthed the tunnel, the operation was certainly not a primary motivator
for the cable repairs that led to the discovery. As stated, these cables were major
communication lines for the Soviets. When the rainfall caused faults the ability to
communicate effectively diminished. This knowledge is confirmed by the intelligence
from the tunnel, therefore alerting those in charge as to which Soviet officers had lost
communications as a result. The report cites, ‘Marshal Grechko...General Kosyakin,
Malyi, Tsarenko, and Dudakov’ as well as ‘the Main Soviet Signal Center...and the
Soviet Air Warning Control Center’ which both lost communications with Moscow.72
Noting that the tunnel allowed important figures to be aware of which Soviet figures had
lost communications also enhances the potential misgivings they must have had about
the tunnel’s eventual discovery. It would be highly unlikely that these Soviet
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communication gaps would be left unresolved for any prolonged period, and any
maintenance would unveil the tap. Those in Berlin notified the headquarters that the
prolonged future of the operation left the main available precaution being primarily
crossing fingers.73 It was approximately two days after this statement that Russian
speech was heard on a microphone at the tap chamber.
The tunnel was still operating and monitoring communications at this point. It is
noted that ‘the discovery of the tap chamber aroused no suspicion’.74 This is not,
however, related to Blake’s undermining of the operation and maintenance crews being
aware of what they had discovered. The lack of alarm was instead related to a
misunderstanding of what had been uncovered. Who could expect a major tap chamber
under a main highway? The crews instead believed that the discovery was a repeater
point under a manhole covering.75 While a Soviet captain was part of this discovery
group, he also was not aware of what they had uncovered. The group’s confusion about
their discovery makes the lack of alarm unsurprising but also leads to a more significant
conclusion. If awareness of the operation on the Soviet side had spread, it had certainly
not spread to the ground level and among the individuals most likely to stumble upon
the tunnel.
The discovery itself was also a much more prolonged affair than simply
uncovering the tap and acting upon the uncovering. The report states that ‘At
approximately 0200 hours the top of the tap chamber was discovered’.76 After this it was
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a gradual process of completely unearthing the tap chamber and tunnel while also
working out the nature of its use. Soviet figures were travelling to and from the scene
with regularity and it is presented as a place of fervent and hectic activity. Attempting to
work out what the crews had stumbled upon is a regular theme through the morning of
the discovery. At approximately 0635 the statement “the cable is tapped” was made for
the first time at the scene.77 Prior to this it is testament to the scale of the operation that
many of the details were still being recorded through observation from the facility and
elements of the tap that were still operational. Major Alpatov, who was in charge of the
signal station in the area, moved the most important communications at the time to
overhead lines, showing an awareness that this was a cable tap operation once more of
the chamber had been uncovered. Traffic still flowed through the tap until 1535 when
the wires were cut, but the last ‘call of any interest was placed sometime between 0800
and 0900’.78 In this call it is noted that the to and fro of communications in the Soviet
leadership were re-routed through different lines. More calls were attempted before
1535 and the cutting of the wires but the operator refused to connect them, citing what
must have been a direct order from Soviet command.79 The eleven or so hours it took
from the uncovering of the tap chamber to the cutting of the cables highlights the quick
actions taken by the Soviets, but in this episode it is easy to note that the true nature of
what had been uncovered was not known until later. It is noted that communications
were shifted once suspicion had emerged around 0600. The full details of the Soviet
uncovering of the tunnel highlights the level of coverage that the taps provided. It is
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revealing to observe that the Soviet uncovering did not show any sign of pre-planning.
In addition, while the tap chamber had been discovered, the much greater technical
achievement of the tunnel was still hidden. Only by 1300 had access to the main tunnel
been achieved. It took until 1550 for the German crews to dismantle the microphone
which had been covering the process of discovery. As stated in the report, this marked
the true termination of the project for intelligence purposes, ‘Shortly afterward the
microphone went dead and, after 11 months and 11 days, the operational phase of
[Operation Gold] was completed.’80
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Resulting Intelligence
The Berlin tunnel undoubtedly provided extensive intelligence for the American
and British agencies. In an appendix as part of the CSHP report on the operation, the
resulting comments on the information gleaned were positive about its usage in
informing policy decisions. The transcription of material was part of the REGAL project.
This ‘provided unique and highly valuable current information on the order of battle,
training, organization, equipment and preparation of the Soviet and East German
ground forces.’81 This can be corroborated with more specific information such as
‘valuable information on atomic energy activities in East Germany, including
organization relationships, personalities, procurement details, and uranium ore
shipment data.’82 While this is not a full statement of the intelligence the tunnel provided,
it is evidence of its usage by branches of the CIA. In addition, it is highly likely that the
actual source would not have been revealed, therefore these comments would not have
been shaped by the uncovering of the tunnel. The relative value of the information is
debated in Wilderness of Mirrors a
 nd Battleground Berlin, b
 ut it remains difficult to
argue that the operation did not provide much substance when faced with the
production noted in the CIA report. Evidently summarised, the products are divided into
sections and subsections: political, scientific, operational and military, itself divided into:
general, air, ground forces and navy.83 We have seen thus far that much of CIA activity
was directed toward Order of Battle information as well as quelling fears and anxieties
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in the political sphere. While this information is argued to be less valuable than
intelligence which directly weakens the Soviets, it was also a substantial element of the
justification for the operation’s approval. This significance may be undervalued by
subsequent studies, but the report itself states: ‘The REGAL operation provided the
United States and the British with a unique source of current intelligence on the Soviet
Orbit of a kind and quality which had not been available since 1948.’84 While later
studies have potentially integrated costs and results to provide evidence for whether the
operation was value for money, the impression seen in contemporary stories and
reports places the tunnel as an example of great success. With the REGAL translation
of the material from Operation Gold the network of branches and intricacies of a covert
undertaking are truly revealed. The results section heavily leads into the legacy of the
operation both with considerations of Blake’s leak and whether the operation is framed
from the Soviet or American perspective.
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Volume
Even from the outset of the operation the sheer volume of the take was a
consideration for those in charge. The scale of information gathered was breathtaking
even after the operation was terminated. This can be tied to some conclusions which
would inevitably be positive for the operation. Namely that with such a high volume of
intelligence takings, it is inevitable that some of it would be useful, accurate and
immediately actable upon. In the CSHP report it is highlighted that a decision was
therefore taken that ‘personnel and equipment were programmed initially to exploit
approximately ten percent of the anticipated take.’85 With the security around the
operation, finding enough translators and transcribers to actually assist with this process
was highly problematic. While there are no values on how much of the information was
translated it is highly likely that much of the information which passed through the tunnel
was neglected. Staff worked on two-week rotations with a day off and in addition to this
had to deal with a tunnel that was producing conversations 24 hours a day.
A list which encompasses this vast volume can be created from the report below:86
-

28 telegraphic circuits and 121 voice circuits were recorded continuously, using
approximately 50,000 reels, or put in weight 25 tons, of magnetic tape.

-

The London processing center employed a peak number of 317 persons.
Transcribing,

20,000

Soviet

two-hour

voice

reels

containing

368,000

conversations. In addition to 5,500 German two-hour voice reels containing
75,000 conversations, of which 17,000 were fully transcribed.
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-

The Washington center employed a peak number of 350. Transcribing, 18,000
six-hour Soviet teletype reels and 11,000 six-hour German teletype reels.

-

A small processing unit of 2-4 persons was maintained at the Berlin site to permit
on-the-spot monitoring of the most significant or “hot” intelligence.

In total the number of conversations would number much greater than 500,000.
Furthermore, it is noted in the report that as part of these ‘six-hour teletype reels’ the
potential length would be upwards of 216 hours due to the technology of different
circuits within these reels. The most revealing statistic is related to the continual nature
of the intelligence passing through the tunnel:

The daily output was about 4,000 feet of teletype messages. Printed in book
form, these messages would have filled a space ten feet wide, 15 feet long, and
eight feet high.87
With this daily output, even 11 months and 11 days at an average output should be
seen to be a veritable treasure trove of intelligence. In an environment where
information was so highly valued, the tunnel could almost be seen as a money machine
providing the British and Americans with a constantly refilled pool of knowledge. These
values lead to one of the most significant conclusions which was corroborated by
Kondrashev in Battleground Berlin: the Soviets could not possibly have afforded to
consistently feed disinformation through the tunnel.88 In addition, the continual nature of
the tap means that any consistent disinformation would have tipped off the Americans
about a potential mole within the operation. This strengthens the conclusion reached in
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the production section of the report that, ‘we have no evidence that the Soviets
attempted to feed us deceptive material through this source.’89 Even after the tunnel
was terminated and Blake’s treachery was revealed it was not worth considering
whether some of the taking was compromised. The sheer volume left little space for
actually believing that all information was undermined by subsequent developments.
The significant investment from the American side would have had to be matched by
Soviet counterintelligence measures and this was simply unrealistic. While the KGB had
substantial history on their side, they could not match American investment. Creating a
choreographed discovery could be more damaging in the long run than any
counterintelligence measure. In addition, choreographing an accidental discovery would
be much less risky for Blake’s position. This leads into the nature of the tunnel’s
discovery and its framing in a way to enhance or diminish either side’s prestige.

Order of Battle
The sheer volume significantly enhances the value of the operation as a whole.
However, in addition to this factor the nature of the information gained, in my mind,
further legitimizes the operation. A fundamental gap in Anglo-American intelligence had
developed leading into the 1950s and the Berlin tunnel went a long way to alter this
situation. Both the British and Americans desired a consistent source of Order of Battle
information on the Soviets, Churchill, in October 1953, impatiently asked, ‘What is the
latest statement of the relative strengths in Europe of the Russian and satellite forces
compared to the Nato forces?’90 Add to this an often quoted statement from Chief of
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Staff in the US, George Marshall, ‘I don’t care what it takes, I just want twenty-four
hours’ notice of a Soviet attack.’91 Both of these statements from leading political figures
identify the role of the CIA and SIS as a potential informer of policy. The Berlin Tunnel
was intended to fulfil the role of early warnings about potential Soviet military moves
and given the scale of information it took, it is unlikely that this was the only purpose it
served. Nevertheless, its results contained substantial knowledge about various
situations and structures in the Soviet Union. Its primary achievement in Order of Battle
information was quelling widespread anxiety about the potential of a Soviet invasion of
Berlin. Furthermore it provided an interesting image of the Soviets in East Germany in
which ‘unpreparedness, confusion, and indecision’ characterised responses whenever
incidents in East Berlin involved citizens from the West.92
In the recapitulation of the intelligence derived from the tunnel, it is also notable
that information was acted on relatively quickly: ‘The Soviet decision to implement the
establishment of an East German Army was disclosed by REGAL in October 1955, in
time to notify our representatives at the Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Geneva to that
effect.’93 Furthermore, REGAL provided details about the decisions of the 20th Party
Congress in which Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ effectively defined a new direction for
the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin.94 This information may not have been
knowledge which the Americans or British could immediately act upon. However, it was
certainly a coup to have this information, which was causing upheaval in the USSR. The
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response in the Soviet Union likely relaxed the allied forces who were otherwise kept on
edge about Soviet foreign policy and action. This encompasses a large amount of the
intelligence derived; mainly, knowledge which stopped potentially unnerving changes in
Soviet approaches affecting US or British actions.
Another major fear which was addressed by the tunnel was the position of
nuclear development. The intelligence derived addressed not only the development of
delivery capabilities but also the structure of the Soviet atomic energy program.95 The
results from the tunnel helped to create a more detailed image of Soviet command in
almost all important aspects. Military positions were established, naval strength was
addressed, airforce development was acknowledged and the nature of political relations
and intentions was disclosed. In addition, it was only through the operation that these
previous gaps were addressed. Soviet movement and intentions were therefore likely
known before they physically happened. Pre-empting activity was a major focus of both
the KGB and CIA. Creating a deeper understanding of the standing of the enemy
allowed greater political maneuvering and confidence in policy decisions. As the Army
comment on REGAL information concludes, ‘the variety of the types of information
found in REGAL have confirmed that it is our best source of early warning of Soviet
attack.’96 Operation Gold provided greater Order of Battle information than had been
available for years, at a time when it was being most heavily requested. The volume in
addition to the form of intelligence provided a background for policy decisions. The
importance of the cables tapped meant that communications about Soviet movement
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would have to pass through the tunnel. Whether or not all the information was
transcribed does not diminish the value of the information that was transcribed and
acted upon, whether to reduce certain anxieties or support specific political decisions.
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Aftermath
The discovery of the tunnel has already been addressed in relation to the causes
and narrative of the gradual uncovering. Over the course of 21st April 1956 this gradual
process took place, the tunnel was only opened up following hours of Soviet
investigation of the actual tap and chamber. However, the most significant element of
the event was actually the reaction to and framing of the tunnel. The CSHP report notes
that throughout the operation constant attention was paid to the potential results of its
discovery.97 General consensus was supposedly reached that the knowledge of the
tunnel’s existence would be suppressed by the Soviets, despite the fact that they had
known of the operation at least four years prior to its public exposure. Nevertheless, the
conclusion of the Soviet reaction being ‘exactly contrary to expectation’ is likely to be an
accurate representation of actions following the tunnel’s discovery.98 It has also been
established that heavy rainfall had not only compromised the cables that were tapped,
but other communication lines in the area as well. This could have caused some of the
problems that led to the collapse of communication about Soviet policy on the
discovery. An example of this can be found in the CSHP report, such that, ‘The
Commandant of the Soviet Berlin Garrison, who would normally have controlled the
handling of the situation’ was absent.99 To make matters worse the Acting
Commandant, Colonel Ivan Kotsyuba ‘was forced to make a personal decision on a
course of action without benefit of advice from Moscow.’100 This corresponds with the
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narrative of other Berlin tunnel histories and this situation which prompted the specific
Soviet reaction certainly surprised CIA officials and leaders. By inviting the media from
both the East and West sides the decision allowed reporters to establish their own
narrative of the tunnel and frame the operation in a fashion to align with their intentions.
The personal reactions of those who discovered the tunnel is as revealing as the
reaction of the media who certainly sensationalized the story. It is also commonly noted
that the sentiment of most journalists was one of amazement; one of the reactions is
related in Battleground Berlin, ‘Look at that...it goes all the way under the highway! How
did they do it? It’s fantastic!’101 The discovery is seemingly accidental, but once
uncovered the privileged knowledge of higher level Soviet officials no longer had the
sensitivity it had beforehand. It could then be utilized to inform the public approach
toward the tunnel and attempt to control reaction. The actions taken after the discovery
consisted of five recommendations: ‘1) A written protest to the HQ of American forces in
Europe, published in the press; 2) Invitation of correspondents from both East and West
Berlin; 3) Approval for Germans to speak out but only after publication of Soviet side; 4)
A group of Soviet specialists to study the equipment; 5) Direct all accusations against
the US.’102 The final recommendation is revealing of the intricacies of politics and covert
warfare. Not only were the British involved in the operation, as those aware of Blake’s
intelligence would know, but equipment in the tunnel was clearly marked. Khrushchev at
the time of the discovery was involved in a state visit to Britain, which in the Cold War
environment had political and diplomatic importance. Therefore the Soviets did not want
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to damage diplomatic relations and embarrass their leader by implicating the British in
the operation. A choreographed discovery was therefore rapidly planned and it was
evident that ‘Kotsyuba’s aim was to expose, for all the world to see, the treachery of
American imperialists’.103 While awareness of the tunnel could not be used earlier, in
order to protect Blake, this barrier was removed after the discovery. The Soviets highly
publicised the tunnel, but the US denied any knowledge of the operation. While it was
clear who had led the operation, American ingenuity was only officially “alleged”.
Meanwhile on the Eastern end it is suggested in Wilderness of Mirrors that ‘The Soviet
end of the tunnel quickly became the major tourist attraction in Berlin, complete with
snack bar.’104 The Soviets were effectively providing free publicity for the Americans and
CIA. Furthermore, in June 1956 the KGB released a guide to the tunnel, interestingly
placing the starting point of the tunnel at the garage or power-generating building.
Whether this was to protect Blake, as suggested in Battleground Berlin, o
 r whether the
KGB truly had not deduced the true origin of the tunnel, the attention paid to the tunnel
generated substantial media attention. The public interest in the tunnel’s discovery
meant that the KGB response could not be overly emphatic, lest it cause problems in
the public sphere of the Cold War.
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Press Reaction
An important aspect of Operation Gold is the public reaction to its uncovering. At
the time of its discovery no one was aware of Blake’s role; this allows the press reaction
to fairly accurately summarise the wider public perception of the clandestine conflict.
Inevitably the press on each respective side reasonably supports their own country’s
perspective. However, one finds in both Western and Eastern press a general surprise
and respect toward the technological achievement.
The Washington Post offers a representative example of this situation:

Espionage is one game in which the Communists were deemed, even by their
enemies, to be particularly expert and our own side to be dismally inept...it would
be even more devastating to Communist prestige if it were disclosed that the
espionage tunnel had been in operation for some time before the Communists
became aware of it.105
Therefore the discovery of the tunnel devoid of the subsequent information about
Blake’s involvement and Soviet awareness of the operation, allowed the operation to be
framed as an unambiguous success regardless of the scale of intelligence garnered.
This framing has been clearly readdressed given subsequent developments, but the
press reaction substantially increased the positive aura of the operation. The public had
no need for technical details, and had no access to the secret details of the operation.
The simple physical presence of the tunnel that had been built covertly was evidence
enough that the US had successfully won a “battle” in Berlin over the seemingly more
advanced Soviet intelligence community.
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Time’ s effort, only days after the previous Washington Post publication, similarly
echoes sentiments of admiration and expands the narrative to the media viewing of the
tunnel. This publication, however, notes the Russian expert explaining the tunnel to
journalists ‘with a note of admiration’ and one Berlin editor lamenting the discovery of
the ’wonderful tunnel’ to a ranking U.S official. This can be compared to the Boston post
statement that ‘we were beginning to think that what the Central Intelligence Agency
needed was a few lessons on the fundamentals of espionage from some defected
Russian agent. But, now we take it all back.’106 In fact, the same message can be
reflected in the Stamford Advocate, Alex Dreier’s radio broadcast, the New York Herald
Tribune and Chicago Tribune; notably that of the CIA had finally proved themselves as
a resource in the to and fro of Cold War power politics. The patriotism within all these
releases is particularly palpable and while no agency initially claimed responsibility it
was not a difficult situation to deduce. It could be seen as borderline hysteria by the
manner in which some news sources ran the story. British collaboration was minimized
and while this was also an element of CIA misdirection due to the upcoming visit of
Khrushchev to London, this fact simply goes back to the nature of framing the Cold War
and individual events and conflicts. Simply put, the discovery of the tunnel gave the
media an opportunity to frame the operation as a result of American intuitiveness,
ingenuity and organization, all qualities which they had otherwise failed to exhibit due to
Soviet domination of covert affairs. Furthermore, the Chicago Tribune publication notes
that their journalists were made to watch a communist movie of the tunnel’s discovery,
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therefore undeniably also showing that the Soviets attempted to frame the operation for
their own benefit. While the scale of the operation was unprecedented, tapping wires
was most certainly not, and the Soviets undertook their own operations using similar
methods. Therefore while attacking the US for an operation which they saw as
overstepping a ‘line’, the Soviets were most certainly undertaking the same methods
elsewhere, themselves tapping an American cable near Potsdam.107 The conclusion of
the Chicago Tribune involves the journalist answering a question of legitimacy justly as
possible, stating that ‘ownership of the tunnel has not been established, but that in a
time of “tension,” the rightness or wrongness depended upon the side of the fence from
which the operation was viewed.’108 The Soviets had already shown how they wanted
the tunnel to be perceived.
The importance of framing effectively falls under the art of propaganda, and the
Soviets failed to effectively frame Operation Gold simply as a result of the operation’s
technical success. The Soviets could not release information about their own ability to
compromise the tunnel and effectively left Operation Gold as a free target for US media
to laud as one of the CIA’s greatest successes. If anything is to be concluded from
press releases surrounding the operation, it is the reimagining of the state of covert
affairs. However, it also points to other trends including the back and forth of covert
conflict and the importance of framing events in order to raise nationalistic pride. The
media coverage of Operation Gold, on its own, makes it appear a success. By the time
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Blake’s betrayal was uncovered, the positive effects of a seemingly unambiguous US
victory in covert affairs were already realised.
The media response does, however, add to the nature of exaggeration and
spinning of details. In a 1978 London compendium on espionage, an alternative version
of the tunnel’s discovery was presented. This example emphasised a rapid Soviet
discovery, which resulted in operators leaving so quickly that the Russians found a
coffee pot still bubbling in a deserted chamber.109 With an exaggerated story such as
this, the gradual influence of false facts and hyperbolic details of the operation cloud the
most accurate narrative that can be constructed from historical works and the CSHP
report. The lack of details about the tunnel until the disclosure of documents ensured
that writing about the operation was likely embellished to create a more complete and
compelling narrative. The framing of the event was essential to the media.
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Moral Misgivings
The discovery of the tunnel and its unveiling on a public stage introduced another
element to the effects it produced. After its successful framing by media as a unanimous
American success, it is stated in Wilderness of Mirrors t hat, ‘The CIA was eager to try
again, this time with a tunnel - code name BRONZE - beneath an East Berlin telephone
exchange, but the proposal was rejected by the White House.’110 The nomenclature of
the Bronze, Silver and Gold operations is perhaps indicative of the CIA’s relative valuing
of the projects as well as their identification of a trend in attempting similar approaches.
This relatively mundane observation is further amusing by the code name assigned to
Blake by the KGB; ‘diomid’ literally translated to ‘diamond’, indicative of his value to the
Soviets.111 Surrounding Operation Gold, there is therefore Silver, Bronze and Diamond,
all of which are related to the grand narrative network that emerges around the focal
point of the Berlin tunnel.
While the operation was highly valued and seen as successful in essential
measures the discovery muddied the perception of success with moral misgivings. The
realization that enemy territory had effectively been ‘invaded’ by covert methods was
startling even to the president of the US at the time, Dwight Eisenhower. While the
essence of the information taken from the tunnel was made available, knowledge of the
source did not interest him.112 Even in the planning of the operation, the misgivings
about digging into enemy territory were raised. However, as an operation that was not
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expected to receive substantial Soviet coverage even when discovered, the moral
considerations were almost exclusively relevant to the CIA agents involved. The
discovery and public environment of the tunnel meant that the considerations that were
previously reserved to those planning and implementing the operation were now on the
minds of the public and leading political figures.
As a result, the potential danger of such an operation in retrospect was
magnified. The presence of a tunnel under the opponent’s territory not only raised moral
misgivings but could be compared to a ground invasion. If either the US or Soviets had
launched a major ground invasion of divided Berlin or German territory, the likely
consequence would have been a large conflict. The disastrous consequences could
also have included nuclear warfare. It was not expected to reach this point. However, it
was the manner of the tunnel’s discovery that saw many of these hypothetical
considerations in the psyche of the public and political figures fail to become reality.
While human agents were an acknowledged element of Cold War espionage the
introduction of substantial technological operations that directly invaded foreign territory
marked a new boundary in covert conflict. The moral misgivings were a substantial
negative alongside the positive coverage that the tunnel did receive in the media. These
moral aspects were still largely restrained to powerful leaders, as it was the potential
physical fallout that was the most obvious concern to the public.
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_____________________Conclusion______________________

The continuation of the Cold War into the 21st century is most certainly brought
to the forefront of consideration when seeing Vladimir Putin on stage with George
Blake. While Blake is a link back to events of the 20th century, his recognition in 2008
aligns with a further deterioration of relations which were always slightly frosty. With
fears of Russian involvement in American elections along with the Skripal poisoning in
Britain, the covert sphere has come back to occupy a prominent spot in relations and
the popular consciousness. Similar impulses to the Cold War era can be identified
alongside the memories that recent events seem to trigger. Putin’s intricate connections
to the KGB further these sentiments from this previous era and the recognition of Blake
is perhaps the most symbolic and representative of these developments, especially
given its nature as a riposte to the British honoring of Oleg Gordievsky.
The dissolution of the USSR could be seen as a shift toward a period of detente
with the renewal of tensions marking the beginning of a second Cold War, which as a
concept has been postulated by historians and journalists alike. The Ukraine crisis in
2013 is commonly cited as the beginning of this kind of terminology, but relations had
certainly been deteriorating due to the events previously addressed.113 What does mark
the new era of relations is an emphasis on technological and information warfare, the
involvement of espionage agents internationally has been brought into the light through
events such as Litvinenko’s poisoning, and the 2018 alleged assassination attempt of
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the Skripals in Salisbury. The human nature of these events, alongside the public
political fallouts between Russia and other nations, brought concepts of the Cold War
back into the popular psyche. While many developments in this arena will be occurring
outside of the public sphere, the question of intelligence, information and its use or
value must be one of the defining questions going forward.
The development of technology has shaped societal growth but it has also
drastically shaped the role of intelligence agencies and responsibilities of business and
political leaders. This is summarised by Gabriel Margolis as, ‘an infatuation with
technological methods of intelligence gathering’, and he credits this with a movement
away from traditional espionage.114 The ongoing debates and questioning over use of
customer data and information is tightly related to this issue of intelligence gathering.
While it could be argued that technology has drawn the world closer together, it has also
created a market for information and data which, as suggested, has recently come
under scrutiny. With the growth of social media, information on specific individuals has
become increasingly easy to access. The US has, according to Margolis, ‘accumulated
an unequivocal ability to collect intelligence as a result of the technological advances of
the 20th century.’115 The value of information is in therefore knowing and being able to
understand, even predict, the motives or movements of others. This was an observable
motivation for CIA activity within the Cold War, but can now be seen in a number of
environments in the current day. The potential for information through technological
methods far outweighs the specified and targeted intelligence from human agents, but
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in the modern day the amount of information is also substantially larger. One of the
conclusions that Margolis postulates in relation to agencies is the continuing need to
engage in human intelligence. However, it is clear that in this ongoing transition to
increasingly sophisticated technology, the balancing of costs will define the nature of
covert activity. Technological methods will largely be more costly but it is also the only
viable option to cover the scale of information that has been propagated by technology
itself.

Technology has the greater potential to accrue vast amounts of information more
rapidly. This was a prime consideration for CIA technologically driven operations, such
as Gold. Knowing and understanding Soviet activity in the context of the peak of the
arms race was the primary objective, and the importance of further information justified
the substantial investment in the tunnel. The Berlin blockade highlighted the evident
weakness of West Berlin being situated deep within the Soviet zone of Germany. Even
after the airlift caused the Soviets to backdrop, events had established Berlin as the
epicenter of the Cold War in Europe. Furthermore, it was these events taking place just
before the 1950s which created the precarious environment in which Operation Gold
was to take place. This could be seen as the Berlin trilogy of blockade and airlift, tunnel
and wall which is iconic in the manner that each took place in a different theatre, air,
under and above ground. While escape tunnels were dug under the wall following its
construction, Operation Gold led to a tunnel being built before it had anything to tunnel
under. This adds to the idea of spatial metaphorics covered by David Pike and gives the
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project extra symbolic value.116 While the wall is seen to embody the global divisions of
the time, the Berlin tunnel can be seen to characterize relations within the covert sphere
when considering its narrative as a whole. The operation not only has this value
retrospectively but was a necessary step for the CIA in embracing technological
advances. Both these elements are important in addressing why the tunnel retains
value into the modern day.
It was changes in the state of human intelligence gathering which had prompted
the CIA to seek other methods. The drawbacks of HUMINT as stated by Margolis can
be observed in the case of the Free Jurists. While a valuable source, the ability to bring
down the group from one individual was a severe drawback. In addition the group
created an environment of more direct interaction between US and Soviets. While the
Cold War continued to see indirect confrontation between the two powers, the covert
sphere saw substantial interaction. The manner of kidnappings such as Walter Linse in
July 1952 highlight the potential to compromise human intelligence sources, as well as
the possibility of escalation when agents were kidnapped, assassinated or executed.
The Free Jurists do epitomise the need for continued human intelligence methods, but
in relation to Operation Gold also highlight why technological projects are increasingly
important. A tunnel operation could provide a consistent source of information with a
potentially lower human cost while groups such as the Free Jurists would be limited by
the strength of the KGB in the area. The main positive of the Free Jurist group lay in
their ability to directly interact with Soviet citizens and therefore attempt to orchestrate
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dissent within society. However, it was the particular vulnerability of human agents to be
detected and apprehended that made technological methods of information gathering
more attractive.
Operation Silver provided a valuable example of the value and potential
successes of a technological tunnelling project, with agents hoping this could be
translated to a more valuable target. Important differences between Operation Silver
and Gold provide greater detail to the environment in which intelligence agencies were
operating. While Silver was placed within existing infrastructure and operated on a
smaller scale, Operation Gold had its iconic warehouse cover. In these details the cover
of a radar station highlights that the nature of a covert conflict left such a station being a
normal part of the environment and one which would not raise suspicions. This is an
interesting consideration given that it effectively distracted Soviet attention from the
operation that was actually taking place. With the idea that the environment could
change expectations, the duo of Operation Silver and Gold highlight that advanced
technological operations could be obscured by cover that had become an essential part
of the Berlin landscape. The implementation of Operation Gold is testament to the
lessons taken from Vienna and the ability to construct believable cover is relevant to the
evolution of the covert sphere. The success of Operation Silver establishing Soviet army
movement and positioning without being compromised shows why the opportunity to
expand and translate this method to Berlin was emphasised. Building on the
conclusions from the differences between HUMINT and SIGINT, Operation Silver
offered a practical example of the potential value of Gold.
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The discovery of the tunnel occurred on 21 April 1956. It prompted a media storm
from both the West and East. The discovery itself saw the Soviets first uncover the tap
during maintenance before opening up the full extent of the tunnel. The Operation was
effectively terminated once the cables were cut. While these are simple facts, the nature
of the discovery is open to interpretation due to intricacies such as Blake’s involvement,
weather conditions at the time and the subsequent framing of the event. Blake had
undoubtedly compromised the secretive nature of the operation, but whether the
Soviets acted upon this is unclear. It has been suggested that they simply avoided
acting on the information in order to avoid attracting suspicion to Blake. Another
speculation was that misinformation was fed through the tunnel, but in Battleground
Berlin, Kondrashev dismisses this by suggesting that this in itself would be costly and
risky.117 In neither of these possibilities were the Soviets active in terminating the tunnel
early, it is also fairly clear that those lower down in the Soviet hierarchy were left in the
dark about the construction of the tunnel. Generally, it is therefore assumed that the
tunnel was providing accurate and substantial battle order information to the US and
British. The nature of a covert conflict left Blake as a highly valuable source for the
Soviets, unwilling to risk his discovery.
Weather conditions at the time of the discovery were particularly wet and it is this
factor that is commonly cited as leading to the faults in the cables which were being
tapped. The importance of these cables meant that Soviet workers had to perform
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maintenance. This inevitably led to the discovery of the tap. While the CIA was aware of
damage to one of the cables before it was tapped, they could not compromise the
operation due to imperfections of one of the three targeted lines. These factors point
toward a more fortuitous discovery than a choreographed attempt from the Soviet side.
While important Soviet figures may well have been aware of the operation, it was only
once the tap had been uncovered that they became involved. Maintenance on cables
was not something that would generally require higher level direction. The uncertainty
upon stumbling upon the tap certainly suggests a more fortuitous rather than formulated
discovery.
Regardless of whether the operation was discovered through fortune or direction,
both sides used the event to further their own image. While the Soviets could attack
perceived American imperialism and immorality in effectively invading their territory, all
US agencies refused to accept responsibility but saw their value soar in Western media.
This justified Soviet concepts of defending themselves against Western aggression,
while the media praised the CIA for its ingenuity and success in combating the
perceived Soviet dominance in covert affairs. In the aftermath of the tunnel’s discovery it
was the CIA that ultimately succeeded in gaining the most prestige. The role of Blake
did not undermine this until years later in 1961, and even then the amount of information
that was compromised was not a consideration for many in the US or UK agencies. The
scale of material produced as suggested, not only made it highly unlikely that all of it
was inaccurate, but established the success of the operation as a source of information.
Not only were extensive details about the Soviet nuclear energy programs uncovered
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but also information about the explosive 20th Party Congress. While the media were not
aware of these details, their perception greatly enhanced the CIA’s public image while
the CIA could also leverage greater prestige within the US government due to these
successes. The discovery opened up a covert operation to the public sphere and this
prompted the need to frame just the physical project as a success or failure as the
information it produced was still classified. Operation Gold marked a considerable
technological achievement and this is the largest reason for its discovery actually largely
benefiting the CIA and its image. It also produced substantial material (over 330 small
rooms full of information) which gave the CIA much greater Order of Battle information,
at a time when it was being most heavily requested.

Following revelations about George Blake’s treachery, the legitimacy of
information taken from past operations could no longer be taken for granted. While the
discovery had already been framed to the US benefit, the uncovering of Blake was
certainly damaging to the CIA as a whole. Nevertheless, it did not undermine the
successes of Operation Gold and his role largely informs wider conclusions about the
covert sphere. His involvement prolongs the narrative of Operation Gold beyond 1956,
but it is his involvement which highlights that information was an essential element to
the economy of the covert sphere. Agents can be seen as sources of information. As
such, Blake was as valuable as the information he produced. The Wynne-Lonsdale
exchange, which ended his hopes for an early trade for freedom, shows that a number
of factors are considered in valuing an agent. This can be expanded to consider how
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operations and pieces of information were valued. Information and its relative
importance informs whether an operation or agent was highly valued. Blake was
recognised with the Order of Lenin when he eventually escaped to the Soviet Union and
this highlights the value placed on the information he uncovered. Similarly his
recognition by Putin epitomises his iconic value to the Soviet intelligence community.
Whether the Soviets acted on his intelligence does not inform whether he was highly
valued, rather it was his position and the scale of information which he produced. Both
the CIA and KGB utilized a substantial number of human agents, but it was figures such
as Blake who highlighted the potential of HUMINT and its role in the economy of the
covert sphere.
By its nature, the covert sphere is rarely exposed to the public, but when
operations or agents are compromised, intelligence agencies have to consider how they
are handled. Operation Gold constantly produced information, but it was in its discovery
that it saw its most substantial value. Not only was the CIA enhanced publically but also
within the US government. This interaction of public and covert sphere is a sizeable part
of the importance of Operation Gold. Developments, events and other trends of the
Cold War can be seen through different perspectives, but the media coverage
essentially alters how these occurrences would be viewed by the public. As a result the
idea of ‘framing’ becomes essential in understanding how the Cold War took place. The
concept of post-event value can be understood through Operation Gold. While biases
and spin can inform how an event is portrayed, operations and events can be framed to
subtly alter how their intentions and implications are understood. Operation Gold was an
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essential project to provide the British and Americans with Order of Battle information,
but through the framing that was prompted by its discovery it symbolised many more
developments. Operation Gold can be seen as part of the development of the CIA to
rival the KGB, part of the development of SIGINT over HUMINT and the general trend
toward technology over human agency. This element of Operation Gold has further
value when considering modern day developments.

The implications of Operation Gold are worth considering as they apply to current
anxieties about Russian meddling in the political affairs of other nations. While the
dissolution of the USSR saw a period of upheaval domestically and a lowering of
international tensions, the emergence of Putin should certainly be seen as an
emergence of a Cold War-esque environment. The recent developments between the
Anglo-American alliance and Russia have created similar situations to those seen
heading into the 1950s Cold War. With the alleged Russian involvement in American
elections, the value of information can be seen at an alltime high. The rise of technology
has continued since Operation Gold and the Cold War, it has drawn the public sphere
closer to the covert sphere. Ramifications from cases such as Cambridge Analytica and
Facebook show how information is valued and it raises further considerations on
privacy. Operation Gold saw the CIA attempting to gather as much information as
possible and it is this same motive that can be seen in businesses in the modern day.
Covert operations are similarly still going to be centered on gathering information that
can inform policy decisions. Human intelligence provides specific and targeted
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information, but technology can now provide much more substantial material than was
possible before. Operation Gold is a relevant example of this since it marked a move
toward technologically driven methods. While the move away from traditional espionage
has been lamented, its role will never dissappear until technological methods can
provide more targeted information. Operation Gold was a project to gather as much
information as possible and this aspect creates links into the modern day. The operation
marks the beginnings of the Cold War covert conflict which is a substantial narrative
behind public developments such as the arms race. Studying the intentions and
valuation of an operation such as the Berlin tunnel reveals the direction which covert
activity is likely to take and this has already begun to manifest. The importance of the
covert sphere not only grew throughout the Cold War but has now grown to be one of
the most significant elements of foreign involvement. The tunnel is representative of the
developments that have followed and it provides an exciting narrative during the most
important period of the Cold War.
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